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 Summary 
At the beginning of the 21st century, ethnic or racial conflicts proliferate in the world. As 
soon as some conflicts seem to be resolved, new ones break out. Many conflicts resurface 
each time some kind of path to peace seems to be forged. The conflicts between the Sri 
Lankan state and the Tamil Tigers, the conflict between the Philippines and the Muslim 
insurgents in Mindanao are but two prominent cases in point. Most of such cases are 
characterised by constant efforts at resolution, by intermittent negotiations, interspersed 
with renewed violence, and cycles of military escalation and de-escalation.  
Based on a comparison of three cases (the Philippines, Sri Lanka and Malaysia), we ar-
gue that, in order to understand the driving forces of inter-ethnic violence, it is vitally 
important to reflect on the development and uses of the politically salient collective iden-
tities as well as on their interplay in the debate and struggle over the definition of state and 
nation. Not only the way in which identities are delimitated is important, but their inner 
structure and content (values, norms and behavioural guidelines) are equally of prime 
importance, because the structure and content of identity provide the framework for the 
interpretation of the collective self and the structuring of its relationship with the mean-
ingful other.  
We argue that the onset as well as the enduring quality of inter-ethnic violence in some 
cases as well as its absence or successful resolution in others are partly brought about by 
differences in the interpretations of community, leadership, state and nation, and the 
eventual handling of conflicts within these respective frames of reference. Knowledge of 
these schemes and their relationship with strategic conflict behaviour provides crucial 
links for devising sound strategies which may eventually enable a resolution acceptable to 
all contending parties. 
What is needed is a comparative look at the most important trajectories of the national 
histories in multi-ethnic countries, not only with respect to the sequence of events, but, in 
particular, with respect to the “subjective” driving-forces, which shape the minds of the 
actors and their views on the nature of the nation and state to be; particularly the inter-
play between various forms of nationalism, nation and state on the one hand and different 
understandings of democracy and democratic practice on the other hand.  
As in many multi-ethnic countries the majority of the people perceive politics in ethnic 
terms; the idea of orthodox nation-building with its implications of emotional bonding at 
the national level runs the risk of turning violent, as various groups may try to impose on 
the state and the “national identity” their own cultural features. In response, weak minori-
ties may feel tempted to leave the emerging nation-state.  
When emotive bonding is understood in ethnic terms and the state perceived as a na-
tion-state, the need for nation-building is often equated with conquering the nation-state 
and extending one’s own culture over the whole national realm – if necessary by subjugat-
ing or assimilating other cultural groups. The successful ‘nation’ (i.e. ethnic group) claims 
ownership of the state, its resources and the right to rule, because it transforms its collec-
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tive identity into the national identity. Its history, its traditions, its mores and religion 
become the foundation of the nation. State and imposed nation become co-terminous.   
Any such effort to impose one vision of the nation against others must end in violence: 
be it violent rebellion of the suppressed group, or state violence perpetrated by the he-
gemonial group in order to silence the opponents.  
The counter-model to both purely ethnic as well as civic state- and nation-building 
would be a pluralistic state which refrains from building an overarching nation. We dis-
covered that, in both the ethnic (Sri Lanka) as well as the civic variant of nation-building 
(Philippines), the most crucial factor pushing ahead the processes of exclusion, assimila-
tion and marginalisation proved to be the direct connex between state and nation, the 
drive to extend ones’ own nation to the periphery of the territorial state. This direct con-
nex has not been established in the case of Malay(si)a. Here, different and seemingly in-
compatible concepts of nation were employed at the very same time. The concept of in-
digenous people legitimised the primacy of the Malays and later the other groups com-
prising the Bumiputera. A liberal concept of citizen guaranteed the political inclusion of 
the large immigrant communities. The concept of nation, as a political identity group, was 
applied to ethnically defined groups, which seemed natural for their members and there-
fore required no great effort of imagination. Whereas in the first two cases durable sys-
tems of inter-ethnic violence ensued, Malaysia remained violence-free.  
Our report points to the interplay of three “dimensions”: (1) the vagaries of colonial 
history as well as the concrete processes driving decolonisation, (2) the structural set-up 
of the late colonial states and the newly emerging sovereign nation-states (i.e. the institu-
tional set-up of democracy/state-building) and, furthermore, (3) the processes of collec-
tive identity formation in the political sphere (“nation-building”), by which the elites of 
the new states gave meaning to the formal set-up they had either partly inherited from 
their colonial overlords or put into place on the foundations of the former colonial re-
gime.  
Our study is historical in order to flesh out models of failure and success, which might 
be employed when putting together “recipes” for hedging against the fatal dynamics of 
inter-ethnic othering, antagonisation and escalation, spirals of violence and counter-
violence in the 21st century.  
Based on our research, we provide the following dos and don’ts of nation- and state-
building in multi-ethnic, and maybe even post-civil war societies: 
1. Don’t aim at constructing a nation-state in which there is an equating between nation 
and state. The more abstract principle of civic nation might displace traditional identi-
ties and loyalties, without being able to replace them.   
2. Try to incorporate all (minority) ethnic groups into the state in a way that gives them 
the opportunity to voice their concerns and influence decision-making. The system 
must not allow for the emergence of structural political losers.  
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3. Try to induce a process in which all groups thrash out a common vision of the state, 
which means at least a vision of a common state. They should try to find a common 
understanding of the nation(s) and their relationship to the state.  
4. If ethnic identities are salient, don’t aim at depoliticising them (because it hardly ever 
works), but try to reframe them into a structure, which allows for emotional attach-
ment by the members of the various groups, for participatory interest-formation 
within the political organisations of the various ethnic groups, for the development of 
a kind of social contract on inter-ethnic accommodation and a mutual acceptance of 
each other’s basic interests. 
5. Don’t focus on institutional design only. Institutional set-up is less important than 
institutional practice. A working democracy ought to be rooted in common practices 
and less in formal structures enforcing cooperation.  
6. Post-conflict peace-building programmes should aim at safeguarding gains in com-
munity welfare for all ethnic groups. Concepts for development should be designed in 
a way that they depend on the cooperation of the various groups.  
7. In order to maximise political legitimacy in the crucial phase of systemic transforma-
tion, abstain from installing new “modern” elites of our “Western” liking, but work 
with the elites deemed legitimate and accepted by the majority of the local people. 
8. Don’t concentrate only on the elite(s). Peace as well as violence are locally grounded. 
Ethnic mobilisation and outbidding works only, when the people respond accordingly 
to the stimuli of the political firebrands.  
9. State- and nation-building need our long-term support, as they are drawn-out proc-
esses spanning decades and not discrete events, which are completed after a few years. 
Therefore, do not tailor your support according to the sequencing of the international 
reporting on crises and catastrophes.    
10. Try to induce learning at the elite level, so that the various groups and their leaders 
learn to accept and value the idea of an “ethnic veto”, by which ethnic groups can stop 
policies deemed to be contrary to their most basic needs and interests.  
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1. Introduction 
Despite the variability in form, ethnically founded violence, that is violence along the lines 
of ethnic group affiliation is often explained by taking recourse to several universally ap-
plicable “causes”: socio-economic as well as political and cultural grievances. The idea of 
deprivation driving rebellion is still one of the most prominent interpretative paradigms 
applied to the explanation of ethnic conflict.  
A new perspective en vogue for the last decade, puts this paradigm into doubt, insofar 
as it posits that “greed” has to be seen as the most important supposedly universal deter-
minant of violent rebellion. The basic assumption is, that it is not so much grievance 
which drives people to rebel against injustice and oppressive authorities, but greed which 
in certain cases can best be satisfied by taking recourse to violent strategies. Whereas the 
grievance-hypothesis basically focuses on the marginalised aggrieved masses, the new 
explanation points to the self-interest of the elites of disadvantaged peripheral minorities 
as an important explanation of civil war. It posits that exactly those countries/regions with 
easily extractable and marketable raw-products (such as diamonds, precious wood, min-
erals) are most prone to civil war. 
The point that economic factors matter in civil war is not new and has been proven in 
conflicts past and present. However, it cannot account for dissimilar reactions of groups 
to structurally similar situations. Deprivation, marginalisation, discrimination, poverty 
are to a certain extent cultural phenomena. They can be measured and quantified, how-
ever, their political salience is a matter of perception. You either might or might not in-
terpret your group’s poverty as discrimination, you might either accept or rebel against it 
– in any case, perception and social (re-)action are to a large degree determined by your 
worldview, by your beliefs, by your norms and values. Greed and grievances have to be 
understood in cultural terms, as it is culture, which determines, what should be appropri-
ate aims and interests for the cultural group and its members, which of them are worth 
fighting for and which means are deemed legitimate in the advancement of those individ-
ual and group interests. So it clearly is important to talk about the economic roots of con-
flict but you are warned against reducing discussion to the material side only. A sensible 
cultural approach aims not at disproving greed- and grievance-based interpretations as 
such, but tries to unearth and emphasise their underlying cognitive and ideational sys-
tems. 
Based on an analysis of three cases (the Philippines, Sri Lanka and Malaysia), we argue 
that it is vitally important to reflect on the development and uses of the various ethnically 
framed collective identities as well as on their interplay in the struggle over the definition 
of state and nation. Not only the way in which identities are delimitated is important, but 
their inner structure and content (values, norms and behavioural guidelines) are equally 
of prime importance, because structure and content of identity provide the framework for 
the interpretation of the collective self and the structuring of its relationship with the 
meaningful other.  
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The years 1983 for Sri Lanka, 1972 for the Philippines and 1963 for Malaysia signify 
the culmination points of the processes of mutual identity formation between centre and 
periphery. These identities are to a large extent still in place and continue to frame the 
behaviour in all those arenas, where contending groups oppose each other: on the battle-
field, at the negotiation table, in the parliamentary process, in the media, as well as in the 
international sphere of NGOs and inter-governmental organisations.  
With regard to inter-ethnic relations, the differences in perception led to fundamen-
tally different practices for the political organisation of ethnic interests and informal insti-
tutional arrangements underpinning the formal institutional design of the three states. 
They also resulted in fundamentally different scenarios of national integration: partly 
violent political and cultural marginalisation of the Muslim and Tamil minorities in the 
Philippines and Sri Lanka on the one hand, and Malaysia’s quite unique pattern which 
was able to pre-empt nearly all threats to inter-ethnic peace by enforcing certain patterns 
of inter-ethnic balancing based on elite-cooperation and rule-guided bargaining, on the 
other.  
As democracy is generally counted as an antidote to political violence, the cases of the 
Philippines and Sri Lanka which have both been ravaged by civil war for decades are 
rather disturbing. Their histories of political (often ethnic) violence are inseparably bound 
to their modern histories as rather successful durable “Third World Democracies”. These 
cases illustrate that it is possible for democracy and inter-ethnic violence to coexist for a 
prolonged span of time. 
By focusing on the cultural frame of processes of group-formation and inter-group 
conflict, we are able to account for this seeming paradox, that democracy can nurture 
high levels of collective violence. We argue that, with the demise of colonialism and the 
advent of sovereign statehood, specific cognitive and emotive meaning-systems were built 
up, solidified and reified. These systems resulted in specific patterns of action towards 
minorities and the political as well as cultural aspirations of groups which were perceived 
to be “different” from the groups in power at the national centres. In Sri Lanka and the 
Philippines, the worldviews of the national elites were translated into hegemonial and 
repressive political, social and economic action, which in turn generated protest, and later 
on peaceful and eventually violent resistance by the affected minorities.  
Comparing “failures” alone, however, very often does not make for a good compari-
son. Therefore, we add Malaysia, which is highly similar in many structural respects to the 
two other cases: multi-ethnic, with experiences of violence and civil war in its modern 
history and with clear-cut economic, social and political imbalances during the initial 
period of state- and nation-building, however, without any significant or durable inter-
ethnic violence. With the exception of the city-state of Singapore, Malaysia currently 
boasts the highest GNP per capita of South and Southeast Asia as well as the lowest pov-
erty level. Multi-party elections have been a regular feature of the country for decades and, 
contrary to the Unitarian set-up of all of its’ neighbours, Malaysia is a federation. 
In the cases chosen by us, traditional notions of power and community have not been 
extinguished by colonial rule but were partially overwritten and reframed in the encoun-
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ter. Certain autochthonous patterns of thought and rule became intertwined and amal-
gamated with western ideas of modern nation- and statehood and the cognitive founda-
tions of the varying practices of colonial rule into rather specific cultural set-ups, social 
practices and institutional choices. These reformed patterns of political perception were 
not only developed during the decades of decolonisation, but also put to use in emotion-
ally and motivationally highly loaded conflict situations. The evolving cognitive as well as 
emotive and motivational patterns were successively and deeply inscribed into the collec-
tive memory of the respective societies.  
By focussing on the interplay of culture and institutional set-up, we are able to solve 
the riddle of why ethnic violence can survive in democratic settings for decades. As will be 
shown, the concepts of nationalism, nation and state are the decisive node connecting 
democracy to violence in multi-ethnic settings. Contrary to the expectations of main-
stream democratic theory it is not the civic concept which scores best, neither is it the 
ethnic variant, rather an ethnically-founded, group-centred concept of pluralistic (we 
would even say multi-national) nationalism, which disconnects state and nation, and 
thereby enables the idea of a plurality of different nations within one state. At least in 
multi-ethnic settings beyond the First World, democracy in itself is clearly no antidote to 
inter-ethnic violence. 
Even though the processes analysed by us comprise a time-frame from the late colonial 
era to the early 1980s, the lessons drawn are highly relevant for the present time, where 
processes of state-failure or -weakening not seldom lead to renewed, and often interna-
tionally aided, efforts at state- as well as nation-building. In prominent cases like Iraq, 
Afghanistan, Somalia, Sudan, the Congo, but also in cases attracting less media-attention 
like Burma, Nepal, Papua New Guinea, Fiji and the Solomon Islands the question of na-
tion-building and its relationship to state-building is clearly on the political agenda.  
Before focussing on the case studies, it seems in order to summarise the dominant di-
chotomous differentiation of nation(alism). In the conclusions we aim at sensitising po-
litical actors to the mostly subconsciously held and applied cultural frames of action. If 
these are not made conscious in the short and middle term and at least partially changed 
in the foreseeable future any effort at conflict resolution will lead to partial results at best. 
We expect that most of our observations hold not only for the cases under study, but for 
comparable cases of violent conflict as well. Some of the conclusions might also help in 
devising strategies for putting failed multi-ethnic states on their feet again. Last but not 
least the results of this study may enable us to devise violence reducing strategies for de-
mocratisation in multi-ethnic countries with a high potential for inter-ethnic conflict. 
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2. Introducing a cultural research-perspective and 
two variants of nationalism 
2.1 A cultural view on the interplay of nation- and state-building 
and ethnic violence 
A cultural view of political processes does not deny the salience of non-cultural determi-
nants of political behaviour. However, it argues that human behaviour is culture-bound1, 
that human beings act in culturally prescribed ways, which necessarily influence the very 
ways of behaviour and therefore also of societal and political outcomes. Cultural analysis 
emphasises that the rationale of a certain action is to a certain extent located in the cul-
tural context in which it occurs.  
Culture deeply influences the ways of state- and nation-building, as it provides the 
models of community, legitimacy and authority, on which the states and nations have to 
be built, with which the more abstract concepts of nation and state have to be amalga-
mated and into which they have to be translated in order to be understood by the people 
and become new guiding principles of political organisation. Therefore, in any society, 
state- and nation-building is a process in which different worldviews fuse with each other. 
Even if the new visions and philosophies of state and nation partly reframe traditional 
concepts of community and polity in this process, they are firstly framed by tradition 
themselves because initially they have to be understood in the language of the tradition.  
While interest-based analysis suggests that “basically any human group would behave 
the same way in a certain situation, an emphasis on motives is far more interested in ex-
plaining variation in behavior.”2 Variations of interests and their formation, which may be 
used to explain differences in collective political style, can often been traced to variations 
in culture. In the 1990s, cultural psychologists put forward “more and more frequently 
and persuasively (the argument; P.K.) that [...] basic psychological processes depend sub-
stantially on cultural meanings and practices. [...] A good deal of evidence [...] shows that 
psychological processes can be very different in cultures other than European and Ameri-
can ones.”3 In intra-cultural discourse the cultural foundations are often invisible to the 
participants as well as to the observer, when he is a member of the same cultural group, 
because “cultural frameworks are rarely the subject of self-conscious analysis, for people 
deeply internalize cultural assumptions and rarely see them as problematic.”4 The cultural 
 
 
1 Culture is about the substance of identity for individuals in a society. An awareness of a common lan-
guage, ethnicity, history, religion and landscape represent the building blocks of culture.  
2 Marc Howard Ross, The Relevance of Culture for the Study of Political Psychology and Ethnic Conflict, 
in: Political Psychology, Vol. 18, No. 2, 1997, p. 308. 
3 Alan Page Fiske, et al., The Cultural Matrix of Social Psychology, in: Daniel Gilbert, Susan T. Fiske, 
Garndner Lindzey (eds.), The Handbook of Social Psychology, Vol. II, Boston et al. (McGraw-Hill 
Comp.), 1998 (4th ed.), pp. 915-981, citation p. 915. 
4 Ross, see above (footnote 2), p. 308, see also: Kevin Avruch, Culture and Conflict Resolution, Washing-
ton D.C. (United States Institute of Peace), 1998 . 
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dimension of seemingly interest-based arguments becomes more easily visible, when they 
are observed in an unfamiliar setting. When for example a certain action is explained by 
arguing that otherwise the ancestors would have become angry and misfortune would 
have become inevitable, then the actor’s interest-based calculation (avoid misfortune) 
becomes enculturated and visible as culture-bound rationality to the Western observer.   
Any kind of social and political action has to be enculturated. Anybody, in order to be 
understood and “participate in the social world [...] must incorporate cultural models, 
meanings, and practices into [...] (his/her; P.K./M.W.) basic psychological processes. 
These psychological processes in turn constrain, reproduce, and transform the cultural 
system. So while each culture is constructed by the coordinated interaction of many psy-
ches, these psyches are themselves oriented, structured, and motivated by the particular 
culture in which they operate.”5 So culture is not only a system learned by the members of 
the cultural group, but also something that emerges out of individual acts of interpreta-
tion and reinterpretation. Cultural models, meanings and practices are, as any models by 
necessity, rather abstract, so that they have to be adapted to and be given a concrete shape 
in any single situation. This process of adaptation allows for a certain individual freedom 
of choice and can over time and generations change the cultural meaning-system itself.  
As anybody partakes in several (sub-) cultures and culture is “socially distributed 
within a population”6, meaning that not all members share the same cultural content to 
the same degree, reflection on one’s culture is possible. Therefore, cultures can be put to 
manipulative uses. On the political level this may take the form of a particular ruler using 
cultural frames and arguments to justify their own holding of power. It may also involve 
the use by one majority group, to oppress, expel, or in extreme cases exterminate those 
not considered part of that majority. Reframing is possible only to a certain extent insofar 
as it can be connected to the particular cultural milieu. “That is, people must think, feel, 
and act with reference to local practices, relationships, institutions, and artefacts. To do 
this, people must use the local cultural models, which consequently become an integral 
part of their psychology. These models are not merely categories or concepts: they are 
relations, scripts, habits, rules, processes, inference and decision procedures, evaluations, 
motives, goals, mnemonic devices, symbolic encodings – in short, meanings and prac-
tices.”7 This insight applies to nation- and state-building as well. Any understanding of 
new and unknown concepts like nation or state has to be modelled according to locally 
intelligible cultural codes. Therefore, concepts of nation and state develop out of the tra-
ditional modes of community and polity and by necessity carry with them a lot of the 
meanings and practices which were characteristic for their traditional precursors. Mean-
ings change, but change can always only be evolutionary, as a continuity of intelligible 
patterns of interpretation has to be safeguarded.  
 
 
5 Fiske, et al., see above (footnote 3), pp. 915-916. 
6 Avruch, see above (footnote 4), p. 18. 
7 Fiske, et al., see above (footnote 3), p. 917. 
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For any understanding of cultural practice it is crucial to understand “how culture 
constructs social difference and on which differences a social structure is built upon, how 
difference is enacted in everyday practice and how it is represented symbolically.”8 Culture 
orders political priorities “meaning it defines the symbolic and material objects people 
consider valuable and worth fighting over, the contexts in which such disputes occur, and 
the rules (both formal and informal) by which politics takes place and who participates in 
it.”9 It must also be pointed out that culture “provides political resources for political or-
ganization and mobilization.”10 Exactly because cultural groups share meaning systems to 
a significant degree, cultural organisation can, as Abner Cohen has argued, be used to 
overcome problems of collective social as well as political action. A common culture pro-
vides distinctiveness, it facilitates communication as all members are knowledgeable of the 
cultural code, it offers mechanisms for political decision-making and provides authority 
for their implementation. Shared cultures also simplify the formation of political world-
views, which can be rooted in the shared codes in order to give legitimacy to the political 
hierarchy inherent in the worldview. Last but not least cultural organisation provides 
mechanisms for enforcing discipline.11 However, this does not mean that culture and its 
use are always functional. On the contrary, it can be argued, that “cultural solutions at the 
level of local knowledge and practice can be and very often have been … severely ‘subop-
timal.’”12 This also holds true of the question of conflict resolution, where many practices 
might be interpreted as “wrongheaded problem solving.”13 
2.2 Contrasting civic and ethnic nationalism 
Nationalism as a belief-system, an ideology, and as a political movement has been con-
demned for setting off processes of violent conflict about the ownership of states, and 
about inclusion and exclusion, in the course of which millions of people lost their lives in 
19th and early 20th century Europe as well as the post-colonial Third World. It has likewise 
been seen as a panacea for the eventual establishment of modern, strong, democratic and 
functioning states, which, as argued, need a political identity correlating to the state in 
extension, and thereby providing the necessary emotional capital needed in order to guar-
antee an overarching political loyalty to the state. A salient feeling of shared, common 
citizenship is deemed a necessary ingredient of successful statehood.  
 
 
8 Carola Lipp, Politische Kultur oder das Politische und Gesellschaftliche in der Kultur, in: Wolfgang 
Hartwich, Hans-Ulrich Wehler (eds.), Kulturgeschichte heute, Göttingen (Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht), 
1996, pp. 78-110, citation p. 96 (our translation). 
9 Ross, see above (footnote 2), p. 302. 
10 Ross, see above (footnote 2), p. 309. 
11 Abner Cohen, Custom and politics in urban Africa, Berkeley and Los Angeles (University of California 
Press), 1969, pp. 201-210 
12 Avruch, see above (footnote 4), p. 20. 
13 Ibid. 
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Usually, it is so-called civic nationalism which is deemed to be benign and capable of 
leading modernising societies on the path to strong, democratic and functioning state-
hood. Civic nationalism, at least in theory “(o)ffers a vision of kinship community of e-
qual citizens which is formed on the basis of contract, commitment, loyalty and love. In-
dividuals of various ethnocultural backgrounds may enter this community by committing 
themselves to loyalty to the public institutions and way of life of their residential home-
land”.14 The basic strategy for accommodating ethnocultural diversity offered by this vi-
sion of nation is neutrality with respect to ethnicity in the public institutions of the state 
and the policies passed in the law-making institutions. All individual citizens have to “di-
rect their political loyalty to the state, rather than to their ethnocultural groups”.15 Laws 
have to be equally applied to all citizens. The citizens have to accept the overall decision-
making authority of the state.  
Recipes for nation-building which are founded on this paradigm generally do not pro-
vide extensive political rights to groups, because the very idea collides to a certain extent 
with the underlying paradigm of individual freedom of expression. Open and direct po-
litical organisation of ethnic or religious interests is normally frowned upon. State-
building and national integration along these lines aims at subordinating ethnic and reli-
gious identities, at confining them to predetermined spaces beyond the political realm, 
where a clearly and narrowly outlined autonomy is put in place. This can be described as a 
policy aimed at the disempowerment of possibly competing group identities and loyalties. 
They have to be converted into privately held beliefs and practices. This strategy calls for a 
clear-cut differentiation between a private and a public realm, relegating culture, ethnicity 
and religion to the former and reserving for the latter not only the right to determine the 
boundaries between the realms, but also the freedom given to the citizens as private indi-
viduals. It is no coincidence, that the vast majority of liberal democracies16 have no signifi-
cant political representation of ethnic interests. In spite of considerable variance in a host 
of details, liberal democratic systems in practice are organised along an ideological right-
left scale and not on a regionalistic nor religious or ethnic differentiation. Exceptions do 
exist, but these are clearly viewed with some unease as aberrations from the idea of liberal 
politics, which centres on the ideas of individual freedom and equality as an individual 
citizen.  
Though the civic variant of nationalism clearly holds the promise of equality, fairness 
and individual freedom, many problems arose, when the paradigm was applied to multi-
ethnic countries in the context of decolonisation during the 1950s and early 1960s. In 
social and political practice, nearly all efforts at civic-nation-building ended in failure. 
Civic nation-building more often meant enforcing unity, disallowing diversity and subju-
gating competing identities held by the new citizens to newly invented national identities, 
which normally were patterned along the beliefs, worldviews and historical understanding 
 
 
14 David Brown, Contemporary Nationalism, London (Routledge), 2000, p. 128. 
15 Ibid, p. 128. 
16 Even though, theoretically, the two are not of identical meaning nor necessarily connected in practice, 
the term liberal is frequently seen as a synonym for civic.  
8 Peter Kreuzer/Mirjam Weiberg 
 
 
of the dominant (ethno-)cultural groups of the new states. Viewed from the margins, the 
nationalistic endeavour was perceived to be a hegemonial project, by which one group 
tried to assert primacy over the others. In reaction to this perceived effort at identity de-
struction or subjugation, the threatened groups developed counter-identities. The former, 
mostly habitually-held beliefs became crucial markers not only of social, but also of politi-
cal identity. Tradition was ideologised and reframed in a modern political form as ethnic-
ity-based counter-nationalism, which challenged the very legitimacy of the young post-
colonial states. Frequently devastating civil wars resulted from these processes.  
This retrospective view on the 50s and 60s makes it clear that even though the idea or 
the aim of civic nationalism might be dear to us, we have to think about its utility and 
adaptability in and for certain multi-ethnic societies. Even if the end product – liberal 
democracy – is worth striving for, any prudent analysis has to account for the costs which 
have to be borne in the course of its realisation; and it must also be able to assess the 
chances of achieving the desired result. If these are slim, then it might be sensible to settle 
for a second-best solution, offering a chance at least to reduce intra-societal violence to a 
low level.  
If we accept that, in certain cases, a nation-building process along civic lines might be 
counter-productive, then what are the alternatives? Are there any alternatives at all?  
Ethnocultural nationalism has a very bad reputation among western democracies, and 
it seems somewhat hazardous to have a second look at it in order to assess its potential for 
civilising conflict in multi-ethnic societies. At first sight, mindful of the resurgence of eth-
nically structured civil wars during the 1990s and the various attempts at genocide, we 
may come to the conclusion that ethno-cultural nationalism has to be eschewed at all 
costs. If, however, it is wrong to dismiss civic nationalism just because if failed in a large 
number of newly decolonised states, it would be equally wrong to discount ethnic-
nationalism because of the malign effects it had in the last decade (and maybe in the 
European history of the late 19th and early 20th century). When seen through the eyes of 
the last decade, ethno-cultural nationalism certainly seems to provide no answer to the 
perils of multi-ethnicity. On the contrary, the “return of ethnicity” proved disastrous in 
several instances. However, in pre-modern eras, ethnic visions of community helped at 
times to build regimes of toleration – non-democratic and under the rule of an imperial 
overlord admittedly – which were at times able to guarantee long periods of peace be-
tween the various groups cohabiting on the imperial territory. So there might even be 
some potential for tolerance in an ethnic vision of community.  
Ethno-cultural nationalism, like its pre-modern precursors, is based on imagined 
common ancestry. “It focuses on the belief that the community shares some distinctive 
racial, religious or linguistic attributes. Individuals who have not inherited such attributes, 
may nevertheless be able to acquire them (through intermarriage, religious conversion, 
language acquisition, etc.) and this process of assimilation implies the corresponding ac-
quisition of belief in the common history and ancestry of the adoptive community.” 
(Brown 2000, 128) Large territorial units can then be conceived of as assemblages of a 
distinct number of such communities.  
Framing Violence 9
 
 
The problem with many contemporary variants of ethno-cultural nationalism is that 
they are intertwined with the concept of the nation-state. Therefore, national unity is seen 
as a necessary condition for successful statehood. It might, however, be exactly this con-
nex between nation and state which is responsible for much of the misery encountered in 
the history of modern efforts at nation-building during the last five decades. If nation and 
state are deemed to be of basically similar extension, then there can be only one nation in 
any state, even if there is no obstacle to the existence of several ethnic groups, races, cul-
tures or religions per se.17 In a civic nation, there is no need to unify the ethnic identities. 
They have only to be depoliticised and privatised. In an ethnic nation-state, they have by 
necessity to be unified – either by “ethnic cleansing” or by the cultural assimilation of the 
minorities. The best solution to be expected may be the proclamation of an ethnically 
homogenous nation-state with some kind of second rate citizen status to minorities. Con-
frontation and violence are frequently the predictive outcomes of such a strategy of ethnic 
nation-building.  
This need for unification, assimilation or “cleansing” does not derive from the cultural 
definition of political community itself, but from the identification of nation and state, 
which in effect is shared by the civic variant, which might accept multicultural nations, 
but not nations, which are disconnected from their states. It is precisely this connex, cou-
pled with the absolute sovereignty given to the state, which entices dominant groups to try 
their luck in conquering the state. Given the current global set-up of nation-states, owner-
ship of the state and control over the levers of national power have very tangible economic 
benefits, from the right to represent the country internationally with regard to the oppor-
tunities to fill the coffers with developmental aid and wield power by granting or with-
holding funds for societal groups to the right to conclude internationally binding treaties 
with transnational corporations, granting rights for the exploitation of resources in ex-
change for large amounts of money, which can then be used in the interest of the ethno-
cultural group. Therefore, processes of state- and nation-building are regularly accompa-
nied by efforts at “state-grabbing”, in which ethnic groups try to get into a controlling 
position in state and politics. Both variants of nationalism discussed so far can provide 
convenient ideological covers for such efforts. 
3. Comparing cultures and practices of nation- and state-building 
in the Philippines, Sri Lanka and Malay(si)a 
The following studies contrast three cases of ethno-culturally fragmented countries in 
South and Southeast Asia. Two of them (the Philippines and Sri Lanka) initially followed 
 
 
17 The actual limits of toleration are currently tested in the European Union in the debates about the possi-
ble inclusion of Turkey into the EU. Within the various countries debates about the right for Muslims to 
build Mosques (Greece), their right to call for prayer five times a day or their right to wear outward 
symbols indicating their faith clearly point to the strict limits of the rather secular and enlightened 
Christian Occident.  
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a civic vision of nation-building. In Sri Lanka, it is shown how the civic basis was slowly 
submerged by an increasingly ethnicity-oriented conceptualisation of state and nation. In 
the Philippines, the civic-frame was constantly upheld. Nevertheless, the Muslim minority 
found itself increasingly marginalised not only with respect to economic development and 
political clout, but also with respect to symbolic representation in the national-self-image. 
Outwardly both states held fast to the civic model of nation, however, eventually violence 
between the ethnic majority group and the structurally disadvantaged minorities ensued. 
These cases are contrasted with the case of Malaysia which differed insofar as ethnicity 
provided the foundation stone for the structuration of the polity, even though we cannot 
speak of a clear-cut case of ethnic- nationalism and a corresponding path of nation-
building. In Malaysia state and nation were kept conceptually separate. Even though this 
model was based on concepts similar to ethnic nationalist visions, it resulted in rather 
peaceful, inter-ethnic relations with high levels of growth and political as well as economic 
participation of all ethnic groups. From the very outset of state- and nation-building, 
balancing ethnic interests became a priority task of the political elite. This task was ac-
complished with a very high level of success. 
3.1 The Philippines  
3.1.1 The democratic dilemma of ethnocultural minorities in a civic democracy 
In the Philippines, there is no clear-cut starting point of the process of decolonisation. In 
Malaya, we can at least say that decolonisation was a bargaining-process which com-
menced directly after the end of the Second World War and was effectively brought to an 
end within one decade. A similar view can be held for the case of Sri Lanka. However, no 
similar departure point of the new sovereign nation can be identified in the case of the 
Philippines. It can be argued that decolonisation began in tandem with colonisation in the 
first years of the US-American colonial regime. In significant contrast to all other colonial 
powers in Southeast Asia, the USA began a politics of indigenisation as well as political 
modernisation within the first years of their rule. Within a few years a rudimentary struc-
ture of democratically legitimated governance existed in large parts of the Philippines. The 
first elections at the local level were held only a handful of years after US troops first set 
foot on Philippine soil. From 1907, in most areas of the country, local governments as 
well as a national parliament were elected through the ballot box. Regular elections18 cul-
minated in 1935 when the first Philippine president was elected and the Philippines Con-
gress became the highest authority for the host of internal affairs.  
This soft pattern discouraged the emergence of radical anti-colonial counter-positions 
and the development of corresponding elites legitimised by their anti-colonial stand, as all 
gains that might have been won by the opposition could also have been achieved by coop-
 
 
18 Parliamentary elections were held in 1907, 1909, 1912, 1916, 1919, 1922, 1925, 1928, 1931,1934, 1935, 
1938 and 1941 (for detailed election data see for example Teehankee, Julio (2002), Electoral Politics in 
the Philippines, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, 2002 (www.fesspore.org/pdf/PHILIPPINESFINAL.PDF) (ac-
cessed 12/2002), p. 152). 
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eration with the colonial power. From the start of American rule, the indigenous elites 
understood well enough that the huge number of elective offices, if staffed by themselves 
or their henchmen, would provide for their own continued rule and control from local 
through to national level. Consequently, the indigenous elites by and large collaborated 
with the American colonial powers in exchange for the latter’s readiness to accept them in 
bureaucratic and political leadership positions, where they could dispense patronage to 
their clientele. Fast-track Philippinisation of the bureaucracy and politics19 eventually led 
to fundamental “institutional and procedural mutations that undermined the project of 
installing American democracy in the Philippines.”20  
The two-party system in effect proved to be a one party system in practice, with the 
Naçionalistas reigning supreme for decades. The Naçionalistas, however, “[were] less a 
political party than a collection of clan alliances […]. Networks of patronage emanated 
from a relatively small number of powerful families that, together with often ‘self-made’ 
local strong men, dominated both the political and the economic sphere.”21 From the very 
start, the “frequent use of ‘extra-legal measures’ to defend and expand Nacionalista power 
became the defining characteristic of colonial politics.”22 
Strongmen, families and clans, which had already dominated the traditional polity, 
easily succeeded in usurping the leadership of the modern machinery of government from 
local to national level. Power was exclusively in the hands of the landed elites, which. by 
following the logic of family- or clan-centred politics. blocked any top-down integration 
of Philippine politics. Power emanated from the local level and did not diffuse the other 
way round. The Philippines inherited a “distinctly American pattern of decentralized de-
mocracy […]. The importance of regular competitive elections and the subordination of 
local agencies of the state to elected municipal mayors and provincial governors have 
guaranteed that the accumulation and mobilisation of local personal followings would, as 
in pre-colonial Southeast Asia, remain a key resource of political power in the modern 
Philippines.”23 Joseph R. Hayden, American Vice-Governor of the Philippines from 1932 
 
 
19 By the end of 1914 “the American presence in the colonial state ‘was reduced from 2,623 to 614 […] and 
over 90 percent of the administration had been transferred to Filipino hands” (Joseph Ralston Haden, 
1942, cited in: Patricio N. Albinales, American Rule and the Formation of Filipino “Colonial National-
ism”, in: Southeast Asian Studies, Vol. 39, No. 4, March 2002, pp. 604-621, citation: p. 609). 
20 Ibid, p. 610. It should be added, that even the economic power of the landed elite was enhanced by 
American policy – even if unintentionally, when the latter “decided to expropriate much […] of the rich 
agricultural land hitherto held by the Orders and to put it up for public auction. The mestizos […] were 
the group with the money and the interest to take advantage of this opportunity, and most of the former 
ecclesiastical property fell into their hands.” (Benedict Anderson, Cacique Democracy in the Philippines, 
in: Benedict Anderson, The Spectre of Comparisons: Nationalism, Southeast Asia and the World, Lon-
don/New York (Verso), 1998, pp. 192-226, citation: p. 201). 
21 James Putzel, Social capital and the imagined community: Democracy and Nationalism in the Philip-
pines, in: Michael Leifer (ed.). Asian Nationalism. London, New York (Routledge), 2000, pp. 170-186, 
citation p. 175. 
22 Albinales see above (footnote 19), p. 613. 
23 Eva-Lotte E. Hedman, John T. Sidel, Philippine Politics and Society in the Twentieth Century: Colonial 
Legacies, post-colonial trajectories, London/New York (Routledge), 2000, p. 170. Anderson rightly ob-
serves that “the American system of single-member districts with legal residence in those districts re-
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until the eve of World War II, argued that Philippine politics was characterised by “pa-
tronage control over the electoral machinery, the administrative departments, and to a 
lesser extent, the courts.” Filipino politicians safeguarded the continuity of oligarchic fam-
ily rule by creating a “feudal structure extending from the ‘national leader’ to the party 
workers in the most distant barrios.”24 The nodal points of the system were a limited 
number of “political dynasties” whose infighting constituted politics in the Philippines to 
a very large extent. The consolidation of economic and political power in the hands of a 
small oligarchy of land-based regional elite-families, gave “birth to a political system 
where the central state existed to serve regional elite interests.”25 Following the end of co-
lonial rule and the withdrawal of the colonial overlord, the already strong centripetal ten-
dencies led to a near complete loss of control of the central government over the country-
side. Some of the local rulers could best be described as warlords, complete with own 
bailiwicks, where their will reigned supreme, with family representatives in the capital and 
the necessary means of coercion: control over the police force and their own private army, 
which in some cases numbered up to several hundred heavily armed men. Some of the 
names which gained prominence and notoriety at this time are still prominent in politics26 
– now the children or grandchildren of the erstwhile warlords occupy their ancestors’ 
places. 
Even though some aspects have changed during the last decades the basic set-up has 
been retained: “ the subordination of a poorly insulated state apparatus to a multi-tiered 
set of elected officials; an impoverished, insecure, and economically dependent electorate 
susceptible to clientelist, coercive, and monetary inducements and pressures; and an 
economy in which state resources and regulatory mechanisms remain both available for 
private appropriation by elected officials and central to local capital accumulation.”27 In 
summary, we do not find, as is often claimed, a weak state and a strong society, but an 
oligarchically penetrated state coexisting with a rather weak society. It would be wrong to 
argue that there is a strong society, insofar as the term society has to be differentiated into 
its constituent parts – the politically strong are elite families, clans and other kinds of kin-
ship network based on real or imagined kinship ties. The politically extremely weak are 
the broad masses of the people, an observation which holds true despite the famous “peo-
ple’s power movements” and the broad civil society. Philippine politics is still to a large 
extent kinship politics of an oligarchic nature. It always has been and still is characterised 
 
 
quired of candidates, took on a peculiar oligarchic hue from its linkage with the colony’s ethnolinguistic 
heterogeneity […]. It dispersed power across the archipelago, while assuring the provincial caciques of 
more or less equal representation in Manila.” (Anderson, see above (footnote 20), pp. 273-274). 
24 Hayden 1942 cited in Albinales, see above (footnote 19), p. 614. 
25 Jennifer Conroy Franco, Elections and Democratization in the Philippines, New York/London 
(Routledge), 2001, p. 14. 
26 For example Ramon Durano (Cebu), Mohamad Ali Dimaporo (Lanao), Rafael Lacson (Negros Orien-
tal).  
27 Hedman/Sidel, see above (footnote 23), p. 108. 
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by “the family as a circle of trust beyond which lies only betrayal”.28 Two phenomena are 
integrated in these politics – rent-seeking on the national level, and political violence on 
the regional and local level: “Unlike Manila elites who operate within a culture of metro-
politan civility, provincial families are forced to engage in systematic political violence 
either as agents or opponents.”29  
So in effect, Philippine democracy comprised for most of the last century the rule of an 
oligarchy of a few hundred families, which, however, had to pose as a national elite, as the 
ballot box was an important weapon in the political battles between the competing fami-
lies. They had to present themselves as legitimate rulers of the land and therefore they had 
to invent a history which would lay the mantle of rule on their shoulders. As this rule was 
based on retaining the multiple loci of oligarchic power, democracy – the institutional 
guarantee of oligarchic family rule in the Philippines – had to be incorporated into the 
image of the nation. In the absence of a pre-colonial history in which to anchor the mod-
ern nation, and in the absence of a common tradition or a counter-religion by which the 
indigenous community could be distanced from the colonial overlords, national identity 
became a rather shallow concept. It centred on “democracy and competitive economic 
development”30 – both concepts which safeguarded unfettered oligarchic political rule and 
economic dominance. Democracy in effect became oligarchy: participation is reduced to 
the right to choose between contending elite-families and family-alliances, and competi-
tive economic development becomes a safety valve against any demands for social and 
economic justice. One of the most famous dynasty heads and warlords of the modern 
Philippines even invoked god himself in legitimating continued family rule. Ramon Du-
rano Sr. argued in 1986 that “(o)f the 12 apostles […] five are first-degree cousins of Je-
sus. […] Of the 12, the only one not related to Jesus by blood was Judas Iscariot who be-
trayed the Lord. […] Now […] don’t tell me this dynasty of Marcos, or my dynasty and 
the dynasty of Dimaporo in Lanao are our invention. Jesus was the one who invented the 
dynasty.”31 
As national history was to support continued elite-rule, it had to be remembered in a 
way, which legitimised the elite families of the day by the actions and deeds of their ances-
tors. At the same time, the model revolutionaries and national heroes are supposed to 
supply the raw-material and the pattern for the bond uniting the elite families with the 
masses (the masa) as well. The Filipino elite tried their best to promote the idea of an in-
tegrated Filipino history and a single national community as counterparts to the territory 
claimed by the modern state. By forging this community and supplying it with a unified 
“national” history all the other communities were not only depoliticised but also negated 
 
 
28 Sheila S. Coronel et al., The Rulemakers: How the Wealthy and Well-Born Dominate Congress, Quezon 
City (Philippine Center for Investigative Journalism), 2004, p. 56. 
29 McCoy, Alfred W. An Anarchy of Families: State and Family in the Philippines. Manila (Ateneo de 
Manila University Press), 1994, pp. 20-21. 
30 George Bankoff, Kathleen Weekley, Post-Colonial National Identity in the Philippines: Celebrating the 
centennial of independence, Aldershot (Ashgate), 2002, p. 95. 
31 Ramon M. Durano Sr. 1986 cited in Coronel et al. see above (footnote 28), p. 56. 
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as political entities and left bereft of their own political histories. Many contradictions had 
to be put aside in order to construct the new national history, others had to be reinter-
preted. While this was already problematic for the Visayas, for the Muslims in the South, 
this imagined national history was clearly of foreign origin. The national myth basically 
clothed the Filipinos in a Catholic collective identity, because “(t)he clearest unifying cul-
tural characteristic of the population was the conversion of 85 per cent to Catholicism”32, 
making this commonality the de facto foundation stone of the nation. Thereby, the Mus-
lims populating the Philippines south were excluded from the symbolic representation of 
the nation.  
However, in marked contrast to the neighbouring countries, Filipino efforts at na-
tional imagination never really took off. Whereas in Malaysia the major ethnic groups 
constitute the central foci-points in the political arena, in the Philippines none of these 
levels of collective identity formation became salient, except for the minorities at the 
fringes of the state – the various highland tribes, which came to form the Igorot in the 
Cordilleras of northern Luzon,33 and the various Muslim tribes, which eventually took up 
the cudgel against the state under the newly invented collective identity of Moro. Putzel 
argues that in the Philippines “(t)he family and clan basis of economic ownership and 
politics has made the emergence of civicness particularly problematic”34 an argument 
which ought to be extended to a salient ethnicity based political identity, too. In the last 
one hundred years, neither an elite organisation nor any counter-elite organisation, able 
to transcend the loyalty to clans and families, was developed. To be sure, parties do exist, 
however, they work in the logic of a modernised familistic- or clan-based polity. Even 
though the traditional faction eventually has been superseded by modern political ma-
chines35 these remain bound to one personal leader or leading family. In the Philippines, 
the family has proven to be a very effective mechanism for making and passing on wealth, 
as well as political power.36 This very effectiveness of the family precluded any efforts at 
meaningful collective identity beyond its purview.37  
 
 
32 Putzel, see above (footnote 21), p. 171. 
33 Reinhard Wendt, The Revitalization of Indigenous Traditions and the Prospects of Cultural Decoloniza-
tion in the Philippines, in: Sri Kuhnt-Saptodewo, et al. (eds), Nationalism and Cultural Revival in 
Southeast Asia: Perspectives from the Centre and the Region, Wiesbaden (Harrassowitz), 1997, pp. 119-
131, citation pp. 121-122. 
34 Putzel, see above (footnote 21), p. 170. 
35 See K.G. Machado, K.G., From Traditional Faction to Machine: Changing Patterns of Political Leader-
ship and Organization in the Rural Philippines, in: Journal of Asian Studies, 1974, Vol. 33 No. 4, 
pp. 523-547. 
36 For this see the excellent study by Coronel et al., see above (footnote 28) (note also the enclosed CD with 
a host of data on the Philippine political elite). 
37 Even though the Philippines are famed for their lively NGO scene, even they seem to be largely unable to 
coalesce and surmount the principle of small group loyalties. To be sure, there are a host of holding or-
ganizations in various fields of civic commitment, but there is never any organizational streamlining or 
efforts at merger in order to become stronger, but only ever alliance-building on certain issues under the 
umbrella of shaky holding organisations.  
Framing Violence 15
 
 
3.1.2 Exclusion and marginalisation of the Muslims 
In the process of nation-building, clear-cut boundaries had to be drawn between Us and 
the Other, against whom the collective self could be filled with meaningful content. The 
national political leaders knew full well that the idea of a Philippine nation was held to-
gether by the presence of “the Other, whether it be external or internal, Spaniard, Ameri-
can, Muslim or Chinese, (this Other; P.K.) has […] proved a useful counterpoint at times 
in the manufacture of national identity”.38   
During the first years of US control, the Muslim territories of Mindanao had been ad-
ministratively separated from the rest of the Philippines.39 The US forces and governors 
initiated efforts to unite the Moros under their traditional leaders in order to initiate a 
“process of gradual development”.40 Nevertheless, these “noble” ambitions of colonial rule 
soon slid into a policy of enforced assimilation and demographic marginalisation. The 
first civil governor of Mindanao, Frank Carpenter, argued in 1917 that the “problem of 
civilization of Mindanao and Sulu according to modern standards, or as it may be termed 
‘the Philippinisation’ of the Mohammedan and pagan regions which comprise almost the 
entire territory of Mindanao-Sulu, has its most expeditious and positive solution in the 
movement under Government direction to that territory of sufficient numbers of the 
Christian inhabitants of Visayas and Luzon”.41 This policy of either cultural assimilation 
or extermination was continued and forcefully advocated by the Filipino politicians dur-
ing the Commonwealth era (1935-1946). Independence saw the continuation of exactly 
the same policies of demographic marginalisation by the massive state-supported immi-
gration of Christian settlers.  
The idea of cultural assimilation (by whatever means) was underlaid by the ideology of 
Filipinism put forward in the early 1940s. In this ideology, as exemplified by President 
Jose Laurel in 1943, there was no place for a Muslim Filipino identity, as the national 
identity was supposed to centre around a national language called wikang pambansa, 
which, despite being named ‘Pilipino’ was based on Tagalog only.42  
 
 
 The only organisation, which probably goes beyond localistic and traditional patterns of loyalty is the 
Communist party with their armed wing, the NPA. However, “(f)amilies also dominated the communist 
underground. For years, the leading lights of the Partido Kommunista ng Pilipinas (PKP) were four Lava 
brothers, three of whom became secretary-general of the party.” (Coronel et al., see above (footnote 28), 
p. 57). 
38 Bankoff/Weekley, see above (footnote 30), p. 3. 
39 See: Patricio N. Albinales, An American Colonial State: Authority and Structure in Southern Mindanao, 
in: Patricio N. Albinales, Images of State Power: Essays on Philippine Politics from the Margins, Dili-
man, Quezon City (University of the Philippines Press), 1998, pp. 1-62. 
40 Saleeby, Najeeb M., The Moro problem: an academic discussion of the history and solution of the prob-
lem of the government of the Moros of the Philippine Islands, Manila, 1913, p. 15 and 17, see also 
MacKenna, Thomas M., Muslim rulers and rebels: Everyday politics and armed separatism in the South-
ern Philippines, Berkeley/California (University of California Press), 1998, pp. 105-106. 
41 Carpenter 1917 cited in: Ibid., p. 115. 
42 It was not until 1973 that it was renamed and “made inclusive of all existing Philippine languages and 
dialects.” (Caroline S. Hau, Victoria L. Tinio, Language Policy and Ethnic Relations in the Philippines: 
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Basically, the Moros had to be assimilated into the overarching vision of the Philippine 
nation which was to a large extent coloured in Christian imagery. The Christian self-
image of the Philippines Nation could come to terms with the Moros only by either mak-
ing them disappear physically (by state-engineered demographic marginalisation) or by 
making them disappear culturally in a process of assimilation. The Muslims thereby be-
came the significant other of the Christian self-imagery of the national political elite. They 
were needed as the other, because only by taking recourse to them, could the ethnically 
disparate Christian Filipinos construct a unified collective identity. As Bankoff and 
Weekly summarise: “Whatever the nature of the Philippine Revolution […] it was quin-
tessentially a Christian affair: The main events surrounding its inception, the growth and 
leadership of the Katipunan (the secret society that instigated the revolt in August 1896), 
most of the soldiers who constituted the revolutionary army, the first president of the 
Republic, and the delegates who met at Malolos to frame the constitution of 1899 were 
Christians, largely, in fact, from the Tagalog provinces of Central Luzon.”43 This Christian 
heritage survived the colonial era and continued unabated into the sovereign Republic. 
McKenna points to the fact that  
“in the new Philippine republic only Christian Filipinos were deemed entirely trustworthy 
[...] Non-Christian Filipinos […] deemed culturally suspect […] and regarded as socially 
and morally substandard. Muslim-Filipinos, comprising the largest single category of non-
Christians, were judged to be dangerously disloyal because of their long history of armed 
enmity toward Philippine Christians.”44  
After World War II, the national government of the newly independent Philippines 
initiated a huge programme encouraging Christian settlers to migrate to the sparsely 
populated Muslim territories on Mindanao. Transmigration programmes abounded, 
Muslims and other indigenous groups (the Lumads) were disempowered. They lost large 
tracts of land, they were economically marginalised, and their elites failed to keep the po-
litical power in their hands at least at the local level. District after district fell to the Chris-
tian newcomers, who viewed Mindanao as the Philippines’ “wild west”. Violence became 
an important means of politics, not only, but very often between the different ethnocul-
tural groups. This violence was accompanied by an increasing militarisation of politics, 
politicians became warlords and raised their own private armies in order to survive.45 
Eventually, the Moros, threatened by their very existence as a distinct cultural group, or a 
number of cultural groups united by their common religion, rebelled. In this rebellion 
 
 
in: Michael E. Brown, Sumit Ganguly (eds.), Fighting Words: Language Policy and Ethnic Relations in 
Asia, Cambridge Mass./London (MIT Press), 2003, pp. 319-349, citation p. 319. 
43 Bankoff/Weekley, see above (footnote 30), p. 4. 
44 McKenna, see above (footnote 40), p. 142. 
45 To be sure, warlordism was no new phenomenon in this region. Many of the Muslim leaders fought 
their way to power during the early days of American colonialism. Not seldom the real traditional lead-
ers (that is the hereditary Muslim nobility) lost against power-hungry newcomers, as the names of many 
of the Moro leaders testify. Nevertheless, these conflicts were situated within a local system of feuding 
and clan-war, thereby subject to not only escalatory dynamics of power-conflicts but also to the deesca-
latory dynamics of culturally accepted means of conflict resolution and mediation. These means could 
not be put to any use in the conflicts which erupted between the Muslim and the Christian camps and so 
the conflicts sharpened and escalated.  
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they strengthened their formerly hardly ever mentioned collective political identity as 
Moros. In the past, Islam had been integrated into the local traditional order, whereas 
now it came to play a much more prominent role as a modern counter-ideology against 
the Christian challenge.46 The violent rebellion began in 1972 and is still not finished. Even 
if there were some chances of the current administration managing to come closer to a 
solution, the fundamental problem of competing identities has not been solved.  
Finally, it can be summarised that the Philippines’ way stands out, insofar as action 
towards the Muslim minority in the South: 
1. does not centre on the actions of a centrally ruled state. Instead, action and reaction is 
mostly determined by the complex interplay of the local political elites (Christian and 
Muslim political clans), who are represented at the national Capital at either congress, 
senate or administration level;  
2. is characterised by unfair practice and perverted use of state law, thereby actively aid-
ing the Christian settler-elite’s interests. There is no central policy which formally dis-
criminates against the Muslim minority, but an overwhelming anti-Muslim social 
practice based on distrust, prejudice and a selective reading of history, which turn the 
Philippines into a Christian beacon in the East and the Moros into backward, wayward 
and unruly brothers that have to be disciplined; 
3. is highly power-oriented. The perceived fact of religious and cultural otherness is used 
by Christian local and national elites to enhance the economic and political power of 
own family and clan (for example by acquiring control of vast tracts of land in Min-
danao). 
With respect to state- and nation-building it can be stated that:  
1. neither is of central importance. State- as well as nation-building have been pushed 
forward in order to serve the interests of a landed oligarchy, which in the meantime 
has diversified into the modern economy. However, their members still control the 
levers of political power and mould the institutions according to their own interests.47 
As they are an internally highly fractured group, this gives politics an ad-hoc nature. 
Stability and impartiality, two hallmarks of a reasonably well-functioning state appara-
tus, are conspicuously absent;  
2. the state is highly personalised and localised;  
 
 
46 It should be no surprise that Muslim Filipinos do not give prominence to their national identity. In one 
survey among Mindanaoan Muslims, four other identities were deemed more important: clan/kinship, 
ethnic group identity as Maranao, Tausug or Maguindanao, religious identity as Muslim and political 
identity as Moro. Filipino identity is not mentioned as a feeling of belonging but only as a matter of fact, 
“in one way or another, a by-product of alien domination.” (Bankoff/Weekley, see above (footnote 30), 
p. 77). 
47 It should be added that since the days of martial law the military, which traditionally had no political 
voice in the Philippines, has become a crucial player in politics. In both instances of “people power” it 
was not so much the people, but the military, who actually toppled the governments by withdrawing 
their loyalty from the incumbent president (Marcos; Estrada). 
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3. the national-imagery still has no place for the Muslim historical imagination beyond 
pure folklore, as the national vision of the Philippines is founded on Christianity, the 
revolution of the last decade of the 19th century in which the Muslims had no place, 
and an ideology of democratic rule and individual freedom.  
The Filipino conflict-perspective in the Moro-conflict: 
1. is zero-sum oriented and basically unilateral, insofar as it centres on a language similar 
to the colonial concept of “white man’s burden” in order to legitimise state action. 
This cognitive concept reduces the other to an inferior person, unable to face you at an 
equal level;  
2. differentiates sharply between political rhetoric and practice. Time and again the 
rhetoric seemed to substantiate the fact that the political intentions were good. How-
ever, social practice showed completely different patterns;48  
3. is centred on coupling continuous discussion with social and political action. Whereas 
the first is destined to guarantee that the critics comply with the rules of the game and 
continue to voice their grievances within the liberal-democratic arena, the discon-
nected social and political action normally aims at maximising the interests of the 
dominant players and undermining the chances of protest and rebellion. Repeatedly 
new factual situations – always more to the disadvantage of the minority – were cre-
ated by “spontaneous” local action, which had to be debated afterwards. As the debates 
drag on, new facts are created on the ground. The coupling of perpetual discussion and 
negotiation with seemingly disconnected aggressive local action created a system of 
diminishing returns for the Moros. In effect, the system of perpetual discussion of 
grievances without consequences results in a fundamental democratic disempower-
ment of protest.  
3.2 Sri Lanka – The chosen community 
3.2.1 Between Ceylon and Sri Lanka: Key points of the conflict 
In 1948, Ceylon became independent. The British left two crucial problems to be resolved 
by the native government: the question of citizenship rights for a section of the Tamils, 
the Estate/Indian Tamils of the highlands, and the decision on the future national lan-
guage.  
Both questions had long-term implications for the relation between the population 
groups as well as for the state and for the roles they would play in the nation. By 1949, the 
Sinhalese government had taken away the right to vote from 50% of the Tamils. The so-
called Indian Tamils were stateless, many of them were repatriated to India, only a few 
 
 
48 This point has also been a crucial aspect of all subsequent peace negotiations and deals. During the 
negotiations, the government repeatedly agreed to compromises, which were undermined later in the 
processes of implementation, which seemed to aim at minimising changes to existing constellations of 
power on the local and national level, which clearly advantaged the Christian elites.  
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became Sri Lankan citizens.49 From the Sinhalese point of view, this was not only a posi-
tive effect on the proportional weight of the population-groups, but it also gave the par-
liamentary seats of the constituencies in the highlands to the Sinhalese. Until 1956, there 
was also an intense debate in parliament about the question of national language, either 
English, Sinhalese or Tamil since the ruling UNP party could not come to a decision itself 
without alarming its Tamil and Muslim voters. A second Sinhalese party, the SLFP, which 
won the elections in 1956 and followed an aggressive Sinhala-nationalism policy, finally 
made the decision for the UNP: In 1956, Sinhalese became the only national language. 
Typical arguments which justified this choice were culturally framed:  
“Language is one of the most important characteristics of nationality. Without language a 
nation stands a chance of being absorbed or of losing its identity. With language it has a 
chance of living for centuries. It is because of our language that the Sinhalese race has ex-
isted for 2400 years, and[...] composed as we are in this House, on the eve of freedom as a 
free country, we should prepare for a national official language”.
50
  
Attempts to reach an agreement by making pacts with the Tamils failed because of the 
resistance of the Buddhist clergy, the nationally oriented Sinhalese and the opposition. 
The compromise introduced later, to declare Tamil the official language in the Tamil ter-
ritories could not outweigh the neglect of the Tamils. Additionally, the Sinhalese bureauc-
racy made it more difficult for the Tamils to learn both languages.  
The choice of language had major consequences: It was a big threat to the chances of 
promotion of the Jaffna Tamils (indigenous Tamils), who now had to speak Sinhalese if 
they wanted to work in the civil service. Additionally, the government nationalised most 
of the independent mission schools, that had been attended by Tamils in colonial times. 
By doing this the Sinhalese gained another chance of promotion: At the universities Eng-
lish was often replaced by Sinhalese. This made it much harder for the Tamil to reach 
elementary, secondary and university level and to obtain education and a good job. Addi-
tionally, the SLFP enforced another discriminatory reform concerning the university sys-
tem. With the help of a complicated access regulation, Sinhalese were able to gain access 
to universities more easily. According to the SLFP there were too many Tamils as well as 
too many secondary school leavers from the Jaffna and Colombo districts (70%) studying 
at those universities. The goal was to increase the impact of university graduates from the 
remaining 22 districts. This measure discriminated against the Jaffna Tamils and the Sin-
halese elite in particular, while access was made easier for the rest. Even though, on a fac-
tual basis, this regulation did not lead to a decreasing number of Tamil students, from the 
Tamils’ point of view it was another attack aimed at weakening their position in society. 
The SLFP also threatened the Tamils’ chances in the economic sector by nationalising 
and influencing the employment policies of the companies. The Tamils were now system-
atically excluded from the expanding state economy and civil service. As a consequence of 
 
 
49 Over a period of 15 years, 525,000 Plantation Tamils were to be repatriated to India while 300,000 were 
to be granted Sri Lankan citizenship. The status of another 150,000 was to be negotiated later. Ishtiaq 
Ahmed, State, Nation and Ethnicity; London, (Pinter Press), 1996, p. 251. 
50 The latter President Jayewardene 1944, in: Eamon Kariyakarawana/Neil Sri Wijesinghe, JR. The People’s 
President, Colombo, (A Varuna Publ.), 1981, p.108. 
20 Peter Kreuzer/Mirjam Weiberg 
 
 
the implementation of the Sinhala-Only Bill, numerous riots occurred in the capital and 
the north-eastern areas. In 1957 and 1966, compromises between the parliamentary repre-
sentatives of the population groups were quashed by violent Sinhalese demonstrations. 
There was an increasing demand by the Tamils for more autonomy in their settlement 
areas, i.e. the north-eastern areas. These developments eventually resulted in the organisa-
tion of militant guerrilla movements, which argued for a separate state. They believed that 
only in a state of their own, could the rights of the Tamils be guaranteed. 
On the Sinhalese side, the concept of the Sri Lankan nation was equated with the Sin-
halese race. The only suitable form of state was equivalent to the French presidential 
model. On the Tamil side, the nation was seen as an ethnic and linguistic variety following 
the example of the Canadian or Swiss state. Demands called for a federal state structure, in 
which two nations would co-exist. The amendments made by the Sinhalese government 
since independence showed the growing gap between the population groups, on the one 
hand, and the ideal of the western secular liberal state, on the other. 
It was only on a superficial level that the political elites showed an orientation primar-
ily marked by liberal-democratic principles and co-operation. In fact, the Sinhalese in-
creasingly turned to a Sinhalese-Buddhistic ideology, with whose help they forced back 
the Tamils from state and society.51 Basic rights were withdrawn or withheld from the 
minorities while the majority filled the concepts of nation and state with exclusive content 
from their own culture. National unit and cultural homogeneity were the bases for the 
development of cultural growth and state strength. State and nation were patterned by a 
cultural state nation (Staatsnation). The concept of liberal democracy became mixed with 
the indigenous patterns, which awarded the ethnic majority of the population the right to 
power and left the minority of the population behind as second-class citizens. In order to 
define state and nation, the Sinhalese political elite largely used the communalistic pat-
terns. On the one hand, this was an attempt to disassociate themselves from the colonial 
power, on the other hand it was used to become “one with the population” and to over-
come alienation. Community, state and nation were perceived as a community of culture. 
Ethnicity and religion became the most potent factors of a national Sinhalese we-feeling. 
The Sinhalese language was the instrument of transportation by which religious national-
ism found access to the population. 
3.2.2 From civic state-building to ethno-cultural nation-state 
Before British colonisation, Sri Lanka was not a unit seen as a state or nation. There were 
different kings who claimed the whole territory of the island but in reality they just con-
trolled a small heartland. The British were the first to unite the whole of Ceylon under one 
administration. Before independence, consciousness of a common national identity did 
not exist. The feeling of community and identity was shaped depending on local, family, 
 
 
51 “The fact was that in modern Ceylon a strong Sinhalese Buddhist nationalist identity has been estab-
lished. That identity seeks to lay the largest claim to all that was available in the state coffers”. Alfred J. 
Wilson, The Break-Up of Sri Lanka, The Sinhalese-Tamil Conflict, London, (C. Hurst & Company), 
1988, p. 32. 
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religious or caste relations. Local elites were at the top of society and prevailed on the basis 
of old patronage networks and caste loyalties. Ethnic differences were not overbearing in 
nature, but existed side by side with other patterns of social structure.  
The redemption of British colonial power, the state building process and the develop-
ment of a national consciousness in Sri Lanka proceeded in several stages. From 1931, 
with the Donoughmore Constitution, the elite were also afforded an extensive share of 
responsibility and the general and territorial right to vote. In 1948, the Soulbury Constitu-
tion of Independence introduced a secular Westminster model. The aim was to clear the 
way for civic state- and nation-building based on this model. The protection of ethnic and 
religious minorities was fixed in this constitution, but there were no exclusive minority 
rights given to protect certain groups. Although there were considerable protests from the 
Tamils, the Sinhalese majority in parliament voted for in favour and the constitutions 
were passed. The Tamil demands for 50:50 representation and a local right to vote was no 
argument as far as the Sinhalese were concerned.52  
Both groups argued from a minority complex. The Tamils feared assimilation by the 
Sinhalese, the Sinhalese felt unprotected from Tamil demands, as the latter increasingly 
approached “mother India” during their construction of group identity53. On both sides, 
ethnically bound parties and organisations formed, which propagated images of their own 
cultural greatness and superiority. This eventually brought them on a collision course. 
The Sinhalese were the majority, which enabled them to change the constitution in a de-
mocratic way by the help of amendments. By doing so, they started a "dictatorship of the 
majority". 
One of the British conditions for agreeing to the decolonisation of Ceylon was unity 
among the groups. Therefore, the Sinhalese needed the minorities’ consent until the day 
of independence. By the end of the first elections to the State Council, two Tamils had 
won seats in the minister cabinet. But by the end of the second elections in 1936, the first 
pan-Sinhalese cabinet had taken office. The symbols of the state such as the flag54 pre-
dominantly followed Sinhalese patterns; minorities had to subsume themselves under the 
Sinhalese view of history. 
Furthermore a new policy, opening up vast tracts of the countryside to settlers and en-
couraging resettlement, was initiated. A gigantic irrigation project was also started. Con-
 
 
52 “Not only was the population not homogeneous, but the divergent elements of which it was composed 
distrust and suspect each other. It was almost time to say that the conception of patriotism in Ceylon 
was as much racial as national and that the best interests of the country were synonymous with the wel-
fare of a particular section of its people” (Report of the Donoughmore Commission cited in Wilson, see 
above (footnote 51), p. 13. 
53 The Tamil Nadus, (once 20, today 50 million) were also seen as Tamils. Later in 1940, Premier Kotela-
wala said: “I described this question as a matter of life and death for the Ceylonese. I said that if the Indi-
ans swamped us it would destroy our identity as nationals of Ceylon.” Sir John Kotelawala, An Asian 
Prime Minister’s Story, London, (Georg G. Harrap & Co. Ltd.), 1956, p. 99. 
54 The banner shows the big yellow lion as the symbol of the lion-people of the Sinhaleses and their Aryan 
descent. Only a green and yellow vertical stripe refers to the existence of the minorities, i.e. the Muslims 
and Tamils. 
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sequently, original Tamil settlement areas in the east were occupied by Sinhalese settlers. 
The opening up was justified by the government with the argument that those areas were 
old settlements of the Sinhalese, which were once occupied by Indian Tamils after they 
invaded the country. In fact, the Sinhalese did not only plan to rebuild a Buddhist civilisa-
tion but their primary objective was to shift the proportional representation in the mixed 
ethnic areas. 
In latter years, the approach to ethno-cultural state- and nation-building was accom-
panied by increasing rejection of the Westminster constitution. From 1972 onwards, fun-
damental constitutional changes were planned. The liberal state ideal was repeatedly post-
poned. Buddhism was established as the religion of the state by the constitution. With the 
name change from Ceylon to Sri Lanka, the country took on a Sinhalese name and be-
came a centralist "unity-state". The argument basically ran as follows: 
“Federalism must be got rid of in this country. We want an unitary government in this 
country, but by encouraging the Federalists when they asked for certain things, you are only 
preventing the consolidation of a strong unitary government in this country. The people in 
this country will never tolerate Federalism. There is no room for federalism in Ceylon. We 
are too small a place, and as for our friends, their language is sufficiently safeguarded on the 
other side of the Palk Street. It is a language that is growing daily and getting richer, and so 
far as their language in this country is concerned they do not need to be afraid of its fu-
ture”55.  
More federalism was one aim of the minorities, but with the new constitution there 
was almost no space for it. Unity of the country was perceived as a pre-condition for the 
survival of the Sinhala race and the Buddhist religion. Therefore, federalism can only be 
another word for secession56. With the aim of a strong sovereign office, and to guard the 
religious order/Buddhism and lead the Sinhalese people, a presidentialist constitution was 
introduced in 1979. In order to return to the golden age – the time of Dhamma society – 
Buddhism had to receive an appropriate place in the constitution; a strong sovereign of-
fice would put an end to the quarrel between the parties and the conflicts within the 
population. The goals and programmes of the Sinhalese evidently contravened secular 
democracy and the protection of minorities which was guaranteed by the constitution. 
Nevertheless, the president at that time, Jayewardene, aimed at rebuilding the Dharmad-
wipa (island of the Dharma), the Buddhist just and true state.57 He saw himself as a suc-
cessor to the old kings. So the amendment led to the consolidation of presidential pre-
dominance and to a quasi single-party-regime. Jayawardene justified authoritarianism 
and violence with his role as "Dharmista leader". He believed his task was to defend the 
 
 
55 Gunarwardene, Member of Parliament, 1960, in: Lakshmi Dias Bandaranaike, FDB, Colombo, (Aitken 
Spence Pvt Ltd.), 1994, p. 287. 
56 The latter President Premadasa on the LTTE-held territory in the northeast: “Premadasa found this 
intolerable. He saw both as an affront to the nation and a derogation of the oath he had taken to ensure 
the unity, integrity and sovereignty of the country. “Whatever the cost, I will not surrender an inch of Sri 
Lankan territory. Whatever the cost, I will not surrender a shred of our sovereignty”. Bradman Weera-
koon, Premadasa of Sri Lanka. A Political Biography, New Delhi, (Vikas Publ. Houise Pvt Ltd.), 1982. 
57 To the concept of Dhammadipa: Peter Schalk, Relativising Sinhalatva and Semantic Transformations of 
the Dhammadipa, in: Peter Robb (ed.), The concept of race in South Asia, Oxford/NY, (Oxford Univer-
sity Press), 1995. 
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country, its citizens and Buddhism. Admiration of relics in public, patronage over Bud-
dhist projects and financial support of the Sangha became indispensable characteristics of 
any successful politician. The new monumental parliamentary complex was built based 
on the model of the palaces of Sinhalese kings in the area of the capital of the old inde-
pendent Ceylon. The Buddhist monks were instructed to update the island chronicle until 
his assumption of office so that he was virtually promoted in the line of the old royal sov-
ereigns.58  
From 1977 onwards, the programme of a “just society” was propagated as the idea of 
order59. Inspired by Buddhist ideas of justice, a “righteous society” would develop. This 
society would not only bring back the “golden age”, the plan was to even surpass it. The 
idea of peaceful villages with monks and a wise sovereign became clear in the “village-
revival-programmes” and in the construction of a gigantic water reservoir project.60 Vot-
ers for the government party benefited from these programmes; while at the same time, 
they were an instrument for the party to control politics in the villages. Religious demon-
strations were present in numerous Buddhist inspired rites and monumental statues of 
Buddha and temples. Everything demonstrated the size, continuity and renewal of the 
Sinhalese-Buddhist culture within the nation-state. Religious faith, the view of national 
history as Sinhalese history and the ideal of development met here. From the 1960s on-
ward, this view on history – and the ideals of the Sinhalese nation – were also taught in 
schools.61 The utilisation of an alleged Buddhist tradition produced an ethnically exclusive 
pattern, a homogenised nation, which excluded the minorities economically, politically 
and culturally. Ideas, mainly aiming at unity and harmony, moreover formed solid cogni-
tive patterns, which opposed visions of a pluralistic society and state. 
An image of an exclusive Buddhist state-nation, of a golden history and the fateful link 
of the selected Sinhalese people to Buddhism took hold in the Sinhalese population. The 
fundamental political as well as social values focussed more and more openly and exclu-
sively on Sri Lankan Buddhism, even if this kind of Buddhism were the product of mod-
ern redesigning. Western ideal types (e.g. democratic system, multi-cultural society) could 
neither take its place nor stand beside it. The roots of nationalism were not only in the 
commitment of the political elite, these politicians were the canalisation and catalyst for 
already existing emotional relationships and structures of order. These involved core val-
ues of the common Sinhalese identity. Facing independence, those traditions were re-
 
 
58 Jakob Rösel, Buddhismus als Ziel, Methode, Motiv und Schutz „nationalistischer“ Entwicklung, in: 
Sociologus, Zeitschrift für empirische Soziologie und Ethnopsychologie, Neue Folge 1993, Jahrgang 43, 
Heft 1, Berlin, (Duncker & Humblot), 1993; see also J.R. Jayewardene, Golden Threads, Colombo (Dun-
cker & Humblot), 1986. 
59 See: Jakob Rösel, Die Gestalt und Entstehung des singhalesischen Nationalismus, Berlin, (Duncker & 
Humblot), 1996. 
60 Compare: The programme of the village revival: James Manor, Introduction, in: James Manor (ed.), Sri 
Lanka in Change and Crises, London (Croom Helm), 1984, p. 1-32.  
61 In Tamil school books, a multi-cultural version of state was represented while exclusively mono-cultural 
Sinhala-Buddhist versions are given in Sinhalese books. The Ceylon Churchman, Vol. LXXXI, No. 2, 
March-April, 1983. 
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formulated in the image of characteristics of modern times. At first, this view of history 
was held by a growing number of people for social or political considerations but later it 
became an inner conviction. As the Intelligensia and the Buddhist Orders adopted those 
theses, they promoted them and strengthened their credibility. Today, in particular, the 
Buddhist clergy vehemently opposes any political settlement with a federal outlook.62 The 
new unity within the Sinhalese people created a demarcation line, growing intolerance 
and potential violence towards the west, dissidents, people with different religions, and 
the minorities living in their own country as well.  
Sinhalese nationalism refers to a myth, according to which the island of the Buddha 
was chosen, in order to secure and to protect the existence of Buddhism. This myth is 
used as proof of the pre-eminence of the Sinhalese population group. The history was a 
never-ending struggle of the Sinhalese people against Western, foreign values and Tamil 
invasions. The use of violence against different religious groups and dissidents is justified 
by the task to secure the unity of the island in order to protect the reign of Buddhism.63. 
Looking at the different statements concerning the ongoing peace process, it seems to be 
very difficult to get over this deep rooted cultural meaning. Dr. J. Jayasuriya, President of 
the Society for Peace and Human Rights of Sri Lanka (SPUR) argues:  
“We also take this opportunity to remind the Government that a peace proposition that has 
been fashioned by an inner core of Government modernists and treacherous NGOs wedded 
to the alien concept of Federalism for Sri Lanka will be only acceptable to the terrorist 
friendly Norwegian peace facilitators and the LTTE.”
64
  
Furthermore, the radical-Sinhala JVP, coalition partner of the present SLFP Govern-
ment, has mobilised other Sinhala right-wing parties to come out in opposition to every 
joint mechanism between the Tamil guerrilla and the SLFP. Senior Buddhist Bikkhus have 
claimed that there is a hidden conspiracy agenda against the Sinhala nation. Under pres-
sure President Chandrika Kumaratunga assured Buddhist monks in May 2005 that she 
would dissolve the (still awaited!) joint mechanism, reportedly given to calm Sinhala na-
 
 
62 Furthermore the clergy try to promote Buddhism not only in society but also in the political sphere. In 
2004, they formed an exclusive monk party and won 9 seats in the parliamentary elections. They see 
themselves as the moral guide to the nation and a link between the people and the “king”. Ven. A. 
Rathana Thero, spokesman of the all-bikkhu party (JHU), interviewed by the Sunday Leader 2.5.2004: 
“We have received a mandate to create a Darmarajya [...] this is our final goal. One way to make (it; 
P.K./M.W.) is to politically take it to the people – politicise it. We should politically interpret it and 
promote it. [...] the party would oppose any attempt by the UPFA (government coalition; P.K./M.W.) to 
initiate a Norwegian facilitated peace process with the ISGA proposals (federal proposal P.K./M.W.) as 
the basis for talks”. The JHU has also called on the government to amend the constitution, to foster and 
protect Buddhism as the state religion. In that respect they presented an anti-conversion bill “to protect 
the religious freedom”. Sunday Leader 4 July 2004, Daily News 11 August 2004, Misna 14 September 
2004. 
63 In 1953, Premier Bandaranaike argued “To Sinhalese Buddhists, it has a further significance, because it 
was on that day, as the Buddha passed away, that the Sinhalese race was founded by the landing of Vijaya 
(a Sinhalese Prince; M.W.) on the shores of Sri Lanka. We are told by the Mahavamsa (old Buddhist 
chronicle; P.K./M.W.) that the Buddha himself entrusted the care of this land and the nascent race [...]”. 
S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike, Speeches and Writings, Colombo (Government Press), 1963, p. 316. 
64 Asian Tribune 25 January 2005. 
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tionalist anxieties that the agreement would pave way to the division of the country after 
one year.  
The secular civil state-formation developed increasingly into an ethnic-cultural nation-
state. State and nation became one. The ideology of the nation-state formed an ethnic-
cultural nationalism. There was no space for a different national understanding, ethnic 
group or a nation, because there was only one nation in this country, viz the Sinhalese. 
The right to self-determination was vested only in them. Tamils have such rights only in 
Tamil Nadu. Sri Lanka does not preserve Tamil culture, it would only be preserved in 
Tamil Nadu.65 Group, nation and state were defined in a unipolar way, they were charac-
terised by Sinhalese-Buddhist concepts.  
3.2.3 The completion of the chosen community 
The case of Sri Lanka stands paradigmatically for a situation in which the state-building 
process after independence initially followed a civic, liberal-democratic model. Formally, 
all the population groups possessed the same rights to access the resources of the state. 
This model proved to be a western utopia, in which the history, culture and fragmenta-
tion of society had not been considered. The road to democracy and nation-statehood 
could not be followed as it was planned. Instead the design conflicted with pre-existing 
indigenous structures and societal fault lines. After just one decade, the systematic, collec-
tive and lasting exclusion of the Tamil population began. The political system that devel-
oped was a hybrid of a traditional, indigenous model and a western institution, that rou-
tinely prefers the use of force to secure power or to solve a conflict and follows an eth-
nocultural concept of the nation. 
In the 1930s and 1940s, there was already a strong tendency to conceive the new state 
according to the worldview of the Sinhalese majority of the population. This meant that 
the state should be a Sinhalese–Buddhist nation. Even though this meant the exclusion of 
the Tamil population, such a conception accorded well with the views and interests of the 
Sinhalese elite. It proved easier to transform the traditional communalistic and family-
centred social relationships into an exclusive and excluding nationalism than to transform 
them into an extensive all-population-groups nationalism because race, language and 
religion formed the binding factors of communalism as well as nationalism. In reaction to 
the Sinhalese exclusionary strategy, the Tamil side finally developed a separatist Tamil 
counter-nationalism. The elites of both sides were not able and never tried to overcome 
the division in order to establish a vision of a common state.  
Co-operative behavioural patterns and orientation that would have been necessary to 
form a stable and comprehensive coalition existed only in the beginning. Problems were 
compounded, as it proved to be impossible to generate unity within the own group: caste, 
religious and language-differences, the contest of the different family-clans and local dif-
ferences prevented the formation of one common sense. The westernised elite of both 
ethnic groups had very little in common with the rural and uneducated population. 
 
 
65 Sunday Observer 7 March 2004. 
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Sometimes, they even aimed at creating strong intra-ethnic demarcations. Networks were 
generated by way of patronage and local affiliation. Common identity-characteristics as 
Sinhalese or Tamils were only created in the process of nation-building and formed a 
superstructure on top of a rather fragmented social order. 
The Sinhalese political elite considered it necessary for the different groups to become 
part of a homogeneous nation.66 They had no idea that a nation could consist of different 
nationalities with overlapping identities and loyalties. Therefore the ones, who could not 
be part of the narrow concept of the dominant ethnic group, the Tamils, were excluded. 
This national concept finds its counterpart in a centralist organised state construction that 
makes a federal division of power impossible. The populations’ majority claimed their 
concept of state and nation, history, culture and religion to be applicable within the total 
territory and on all levels of society. But this aim conflicted with the wishes of the minori-
ties, which hoped for individual and democratic self-determination.  
In addition, the history and mythology on which the Sinhalese national-consciousness 
was based, could not provide any solidarity function but offered only conflict material. 
With no way to fight out all the conflicts in the parliamentary arena (the ethnic conflict as 
well as local and sectorial conflicts between classes, castes and regions), options for finding 
a political consensus became nil and the use of force escalated. Between independence and 
the early 1980s, the conflict between Sinhalese and Tamils repeatedly resulted in violent 
rebellions. In 1983, the patterns of violence changed. Riots and assassinations transformed 
into a civil war, that was ended in 2002 when the government and Tamil guerrilla agreed 
on a ceasefire. During the peace talks it became clear that the Sinhalese still see themselves 
as the victims of a Tamil guerrilla, western demands and inappropriate moral condemna-
tion, within an adverse climate that denies the right to reclaim their heritage, their rights 
and their identity to the majority. They feel like a democratic, pluralistic and a mono-
ethnically organised group which has to face a fascist and intolerant minority that endan-
gers the democratic history of Sri Lanka. The majority is thus seen as the “victim of the 
minority”. In their view, they endured the repression a long time, before they decided to 
turn into the “self-defence perpetrator” in order to rescue their culture and themselves 
from downfall. In the Sinhalese system the demands of the Tamils were seen as an unsus-
 
 
66 On the one hand, they need a common element to unite the modern state and overcome traditional 
structure and at the same time establish new ties which guarantee their power. Subject to their cultural 
base, they chose Buddhist religion, Sinhala race and language. Premier Bandaranaike said 1963: “We felt 
that the true and wise course to adopt is this: first to try and unite the Sinhalese, and then to try and win 
the confidence of other Ceylonese communities, and, with the co-operation of all progressive parties in 
the country, to put up a united front against reactionaries at home and imperialism and exploitation on 
the part of the non-Ceylonese. [...] Sinhalese, Kandyan and Low Country, all castes and religions, are 
members of our Saba (P.K./M.W. a political group) which has formed a national committee in the effort 
to secure inter-communal harmony; and we offered to co-operate with such parties and the national 
Congress, in order to attain our common purpose. [...] This change of heart is almost too late. It has 
only come when people have been faced with the stark reality of an unholy, but very formidable and well 
organised, alliance between certain sections of the Ceylonese minorities, the Europeans and the Indians, 
and certain local reactionaries, whose objects are nothing short of 50:50 representation and the en-
thronement and entrenchment of imperialism and exploitation, and the protection of very vested inter-
ests”. Bandaranaike, see above (footnote 54), p. 95. 
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tainable assumption that every group has the privilege to claim their right except the ma-
jority. From this point of view, the attempt to silence the Tamils’ demands in a military 
manner was simply reacting to the extremism of the minorities dictating humiliating 
terms to the Sinhalese.67 
The Sri-Lankan way can be summarised as follows: 
1. The processes of state- and nation-building proceed in a parallel way and are seen as 
an inseparable unit. 
2. Formally, all citizens have the same rights but in fact, the majority is preferred. 
3. The loyalty to the nation-state exceeds other group-affiliations. 
 a) The fulfilment of the basic needs of the minority depends on the goodwill of the 
majority. 
 b) Fixed group rights refer only to the majority, the minorities enjoy only the civil 
rights of the individual but no explicit preferential treatment. 
4. Conflicts were solved with strategies, which 
 a) were not co-operative but are characterised by confrontational and unilateral pat-
terns. The parties aim at negotiating for the best possible outcome for their own 
group. 
 b) Regard for the others party’s interests is taken only inasmuch it helps and benefits 
one’s own position. 
 c) If the groups have alternatives to negotiating, such as pushing things through by 
majority vote, the tendency to make further demands to their own advantage or the 
refusal of the demands of the minorities is even higher. 
 d) In extreme cases, the groups were ready to replace negotiations by force.  
3.3 Malay(si)a:  
3.3.1 Bargaining between ethno-cultural nations in one state 
Malaysia is the latest product of a protracted process of state-building, by which a certain 
number of rather small independent sultanates became integrated within a larger colonial 
framework only to be reframed as a federation upon the eve of the colonial era. With the 
advent of sovereign statehood in 1957 they evolved into the only federal state in the re-
gion, the Federation of Malaya. The successful Malay(si)an state-building was enabled by 
several developments in the ideological and cultural realm, which were initiated in the late 
19th and early 20th century and resulted in a significant reframing of the concepts of politi-
cal leadership, power and identity group.  
Traditionally, the Raja was perceived to be all-powerful in his local sphere, neverthe-
less he was only one of several neighbouring rulers of basically equal rank. Therefore, 
power and leadership at the very top were conceived of in a framework of conflict and co-
 
 
67 Letters to the editor, Sunday Observer 25 January  2004. 
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operation among equals. The relationship between the Rajas was perceived to be non-
hierarchical. The Malayan particularistic view of political order, exalted the negeri (that is 
the small state ruled by a sultan or raja) but not the idea of an overarching negara (state, 
nation). Political identity was bound to the respective negeri, even though on the elite 
level, cultural identity (the feeling of sameness) was increasingly expressed on the basis of 
the Muslim faith since the late 19th century.68  
In the 1920s, a significant reframing of the political and cultural identity groups fol-
lowed the influx of western concepts of race and descent in the 1920s. To the religious 
frame a second ethnicity-based identity was added: the Bangsa Melayu (the Malay com-
munity/nationality). Within a few decades the two were integrated with each other insofar 
as adherence to the Muslim faith became a central criterion of Malayness. However, po-
litical identity remained anchored in the negeri. The new cultural Malay nation was not 
made complete by the construction of a political nation corresponding to the negara. Ad-
herence to the negeri enabled the representatives of the traditional negeri to continue as 
symbols of political and Muslim identity. This reframing of political and religious identity 
is clearly mirrored in the federal set-up, which eventually emerged in the course of the 
constitutional debates. The states comprising the federation were offshoots of the old 
kingdoms and the rulers succeeded not only in becoming the figureheads of the new states 
(viz. their former kingdoms) but in maintaining their prominent positions as representa-
tives of the Malays and Muslims as well. As none of them could claim superior status, the 
“natural” outcome of the debate about their role on the federal level was a council of 
equals and the rotation of the position of supreme ruler (Yang di-Pertuan Agong).  
The mainstream of Malayan political players from the very outset of modern state- and 
nation-building insisted on taking ethnic and religious identities seriously. They did not 
aim at supplanting them with a fictitious all-encompassing civic identity.69 The conserva-
 
 
68 On these and the following themes see for example: Norton Ginsburg, Chester F. Roberts Jr., Malaya 
(Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1958), B. Simandjuntak, Malayan Federalism, 1945-63 (Kuala 
Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1969), Gordon P. Means, Malaysian Politics (New York/London, New 
York University Press/University of London Press, 1970), Tan Liok Ee, The Rhetoric of Bangsa and 
Minzu: Community and Nation in Tension, The Malay Peninsula, 1900-1955, (Monash University, Cen-
tre of Southeast Asian Studies, Working Paper 52) Clayton, 1988, Ariffin Omar, Bangsa Melayu: Malay 
Concepts of Democracy and Community 1945-1950 (Oxford et al: Oxford University Press, 1993), An-
thony Milner, The Invention of Politics in Colonial Malaya: Contesting Nationalism and the Expansion 
of the Public Sphere (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1995), and, of course, the classical study 
of J.M. Gullick, Indigenous Political Systems of Western Malaya (London: The Athlone Press, 1958). An 
excellent comparative overview is given by Robert W. Hefner, Introduction: Multiculturalism and Citi-
zenship in Malaysia, Singapore, and Indonesia, in Robert W. Hefner (ed.), The Politics of Multicultural-
ism: Pluralism and Citizenship in Malaysia, Singapore, and Indonesia (Honolulu, University of Hawaii 
Press, 2001), pp. 1-58. 
69 One prominent “dissident” in respect of the question of multi-racial politics was the first president of 
UMNO himself, Datu Onn Jaafar, who left UMNO, when he lost his case at the UMNO assembly of 
1951. Onn had proposed to open UMNO to members of non-Malay descent. His opponents prevailed 
and one leading advocate of an exclusionist course, Tunku Abdul Rahman, took over as party-president. 
He argued that there could be no Malayan identity, which unites the various ethnic identities and asked 
“who are these ‘Malayans’? This country was received from the Malays and to the Malays it ought to be 
returned. What is called ‘Malayans’, it is not yet certain who they are; therefore let the Malays alone set-
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tive Malay political elite as well as their Chinese counterparts defined the political com-
munity in ethno-cultural terms. For them it was beyond doubt that political loyalty was 
owed to one's ethnic community (Malay: bangsa; Chinese: minzu) above all. Similar to the 
Malay concept of bangsa, the Chinese minzu-concept was built upon the idea of rights of 
culturally defined ascriptive groups. Both clearly did not stand for individual rights.70  
Malay, as Chinese elites, held fast to the view that the community was identical neither 
to state nor society. Rather, the Malayan state was perceived as an attempt at multi-
community co-operation, even though the ethno-cultural concept was employed in secur-
ing symbolical primacy for the Malay segment of the population as the owners of the 
Land of the Malays (Tanah Melayu). The polity was devised as a multi-ethnic arena 
whereas the land itself was perceived to be the heritage of one ethno-cultural group. This 
differentiation was essential for the Malay(si)an model, because “‘Federal citizenship’ 
meant membership of a nation, like a membership of a club with rights and duties. Na-
tionality, however, meant a national identity, which was something else.”71. T.N. Harper 
argues: “By Merdeka [Independence] the Malay community had been elevated into a na-
tion, and it seems that to [Prime Minister; P.K./M.W.] Tunku Abdul Rahman the nation 
was a political and cultural entity based on the concept of original sovereignty. Non-
Malays could be admitted to the nation, but Tunku Abdul Rahman did not concede that 
nationality should be the basis of citizenship. [...] in so far as the term ‘nationality’ was 
used it was used in its restricted legal sense, almost synonymously with citizenship – but 
the Tunku would not allow the term bangsa [race/nation] to be used for it. [...] there 
could be a Malayan nation, but the Malay bangsa [race/nation] would exist as a distinct 
core within it.”72. Although being inherently hierarchical, this double standard at least 
enabled the open settlement of group-conflict insofar as sub-national ethno-cultural 
groupness was perceived to be legitimate in the political realm.  
In the years to follow, these concepts were translated into a distinct practice of ac-
commodative power-sharing at the elite level, which primarily aimed at securing group 
rights. The elites of the large communal groups legitimised their leadership not by nation- 
but by successful state-building, which was largely measured by its socio-economic out-
put. So in late colonial and early sovereign Malaya we find a strong drive towards state-
building, but a near complete lack of nation-building. Integration should be accomplished 
 
 
tle who they are.” (Tunku Abdul Rahman 1951 cited in Cheah Boon Kheng, Malaysia: The Making of a 
Nation. Singapore (ISEAS), 2002, pp. 26-27). Datu Onn in 1951 founded the multi-ethnic “Independ-
ence of Malaya Party” and in 1954 the “Party Negara”, but neither received any support from the other 
ethnic organisations of the Chinese or Indians, nor did he gain many votes in the various local elections, 
which his party contested. Tan Cheng Lock, the most influential leader of the conservative Chinese busi-
ness establishment and president of the MCA, after initially pledging support for Onn’s case, quickly 
sided with UMNO in order to get his share of influence and power in a multi-ethnic alliance with 
UMNO and later the MIC. 
70 Tan, see above (footnote 68). 
71 Cheah, see above (footnote 69), p. 5. 
72 T.N. Harper, The End of Empire and the Making of Malaya, Cambridge (Cambridge University Press), 
1999, p. 350. 
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by taking recourse to a joint state, not a joint nation. On the one hand, the federation was 
to be defined in civic terms, insofar as all people living in Malaya for a prolonged time-
span and willing to pledge loyalty to the new Federation of Malaya could enter the com-
munity of citizens – an option that resulted in the naturalisation of most Chinese immi-
grants within a few years. On the other hand, Malaya was defined in ethno-cultural terms 
as Land of the Malays (Tanah Melayu) whereby the Bangsa Melayu was understood as a 
nation constitutive for the state (Staatsnation). This collective identity found its expres-
sion in the choice of Islam as the state religion and the symbolically strong position of the 
rulers, by which the modern polity was anchored in the Malay past.  
In effect, the Malayan elites fused three different visions of the nation by constructing a 
multi-national state (pluralistic nationalism) based on the idea of citizenship for all people 
owing allegiance to Malaya irrespective of their descent (civic nationalism). All citizens 
were obliged nevertheless to define themselves in the categories of ethno-cultural nations 
for all purposes of political co-operation (ethnocultural nationalism). The whole of the 
Malay(si)an population was seen as an assemblage of its constituent ethno-cultural parts. 
This rather specific mixture of ethno-cultural, multi-national, and civic nationalism en-
abled (and enforced) a permanent balancing act in which competing collective interests 
had to be negotiated and integrative solutions arrived at.  
The emotive foundation of such an ideology has been summed up by the prime minis-
ter of the Federation of Malaya, Tunku Abdul Rahman, when in fierce negotiations be-
tween representatives of the Malay, Chinese and Indian ethnic groups the famous inter-
ethnic social contract was hammered out in 1955. Addressing the General Assembly of his 
party UMNO, he said that:  
“our responsibilities are not only for the Malays but also for other races living in this coun-
try. We believe that Malaya will achieve independence only […] by cooperating with other 
races. Since we have sworn not to create any bloodshed, we should be considerate in our 
demands for the honour of our race and without neglecting the rights of other races. We 
have to work together with a spirit of goodwill and friendship with the other races who have 
lived here and become loyal citizens of this country.”
73
 
His Chinese counterpart Tan Cheng Lock argued in a similar vein, when he cautioned 
against radical demands, because:  
“greed can blind us to realities and to the just claims of others. Unless we bear this clearly in 
mind, we are in danger of sacrificing fundamentals for gains of little consequence.”
74
 
These two remarks by the most important political leaders of early sovereign Ma-
lay(si)a point to one foundation of any working ideology of ethnicity-centred multina-
tional state-building: the quest for the establishment and upholding of a regime of power-
sharing and rule-bound inter-ethnic bargaining.75  
 
 
73 Tunku Abdul Rahman cited in: Hng Hung Yong, 5 Men and Five Ideas: Building National Identity, 
Kuala Lumpur (Asian Strategy and Leadership Institute), 2004, p. 86. 
74 Tan Cheng Lock, cited in: Ibid., p. 87.  
75 The connex between inter-ethnic cooperation and a policy aiming at uplifting all ethnic groups in order 
to pre-empt ethnic violence has always been an important part of the political rationale and still plays an 
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The state was not so much perceived as a symbol of sovereign power but as a rational 
instrument designed for problem-solving. Within a few years, Malay(si)a developed a 
highly rule- and institution-oriented "quasi-bureaucratic" conflict-style for the mediation 
of inter-communal conflict at the elite level. All groups accepted that all parties to a con-
flict had a right to be heard and participate in its resolution, that conflict resolution had to 
be compromise-oriented and take into account the legitimately held interests of all con-
tending parties. Compromise was seen as an aim of conflict management, not as a strategy 
or tactic for achieving maximalist aims. As the people were not conceived of as one ficti-
tious entity but only as the sum of its constituent parts – the communal groups –, none of 
the groups could subordinate the others by taking recourse to the will of the people. The 
collective good could only be determined as the good which could be achieved in a fair 
bargaining process. It emerged as the largest possible common denominator of all par-
ticular aims held by the communal groups comprising the Malayan society.  
Paradoxically the ascriptive lines of ethnicity which structured the modern political 
system were from its very inception impeded by countervailing practices transcending 
ethnicity. Since the founding of the Alliance-government in the early 1950s (later re-
named in Barisan Nasional) its member parties never competed against each other in elec-
tions.76 In order to maximise its chances of success the Alliance leadership nominates one 
candidate for any election district. Therefore with respect to elections, the alliance basi-
cally acts like one single multi-ethnic party. To be sure, the ethnic affiliation of candidates 
most often follow that of the majority of the respective constituencies, however, there 
have been many exceptions to this rule. Most important is, that all alliance member-
parties recommend their respective clientele to vote for the alliance candidate, even if he is 
not of their ethnic or religious background. The political alliance of ethnic parties thus 
fulfils an important trans-ethnic bridging function. Every new election shows many Ma-
laysians that the basis of the political system is, on the one hand, ethnicity, but on the 
other, inter-ethnic cooperation.  
The Malayan way can be summed up in the following theses:  
1. Give priority to state-building over nation-building,  
2. Accept the basic equality of all ethnic groups in respect to the legitimacy of their basic 
needs of identity, security and well-being (equality/justice).  
3. Accept the legitimacy of competing identity-claims and  
4. Utilise a conflict-perspective which  
 
 
important part in the political reasoning of politicians and high bureaucrats alike. In an interview in 
summer 2004 one high-ranking bureaucrat of a Sabahan ministry argued that violence might erupt 
“provided you don’t take care of the social and political dimension. [...] In every country violence will 
take place if one section of the community feels that they have been marginalized, or feels that they have 
been victimized. Or members of one political party feel they have been victimized. So it is important to 
manage the economic, political and social [...] in such a way that everybody feels that they have a fair 
stake of everything.” (Interview Kota Kinabalu, Summer 2004; anonymised).  
76 There have been a few rare exceptions to this practice, which however, were local incidents which most 
often brought about strict disciplinary measures from the respective party centres.  
32 Peter Kreuzer/Mirjam Weiberg 
 
 
 a) values compromise between evenly balanced collective players and integrative 
strategies safeguarding the most fundamental interests and meeting the largest pos-
sible number of requests of all parties to the conflict. 
 b) stimulates non-public intra-elite bargaining, while discouraging broad-based politi-
cal participation and delegitimising political strategies, which rely on mass mobili-
sation.  
Even though conflicting issues, pitting the various ethnic groups against each other, 
abounded in the decades of sovereign statehood, the basic position  
z of organising society and politics along ascriptive group-lines,  
z of giving precedence to group rights before individual rights,  
z of accepting the rights to security, identity and welfare for every single ethnic group 
and  
z of hammering out integrative deals in closed-door sessions between the political elites 
of the ethnic groups 
was upheld.  
3.3.2 Enlarging state and nation 
How the agreement worked in practice will be illustrated by a short sketch of the handling 
of one of the most prominent issues in the modern history of Malay(si)a: the integration 
of Singapore, Sabah and Sarawak.77  
On 27 May 1961, the Prime Minister of Malaya, Tunku Abdul Rahman, commented at 
a press conference in Singapore that his country was very interested in devising some ar-
rangements by which the Malayan Federation, Singapore and the territories of British 
Borneo could co-operate more effectively.78 Directly after his proposal, the Malayan gov-
ernment initiated confidence-building measures. Accompanied by the Head of the Fed-
eration of Malaya, Abdul Rahman toured Brunei and Sarawak where he repeatedly 
stressed that the members of the new state would “be partners of equal status, no more 
and no less than the other States now forming the Federation of Malaya. [...] The days of 
 
 
77 Other prominent issues, which for constraints of space cannot be included would be the language ques-
tion, the preferential treatment for Malays (later Bumiputera) in various spheres of life, the limits of free 
speech and the debate on the creeping Islamisation of Malaysia. 
78 Tunku Abdul Rahman 27 May 1961, cited in James P. Ongkili, The Borneo Response to Malaysia: 1961-
63, Singapore (Donald Moore Press Ltd.), 1967, p. 23. This occasion does not mark the beginning of 
Malayan interest in state enlargement. Its roots can be traced back to the late 1940s at least (see: Mo-
hamed Noordin Sopiee, The Advocacy of Malaysia – before 1961, in: Modern Asian Studies Vol. 7, No. 
4, 1973, pp. 717-732). On the process of integration and the first years of Malaysia see also James P. 
Ongkili, Modernization in East Malaysia 1960-1970, Kuala Lumpur/Singapore, (Oxford University 
Press), 1972; Robert S. Milne, Kanagaratnam J. Ratnam, Malaysia – New States in a New Nation: Politi-
cal Development of Sarawak and Sabah in Malaysia, London (Frank Cass), 1974; Margaret, Clark Roff, 
The Politics of Belonging: Political Change in Sabah and Sarawak, Kuala Lumpur, et al. (Oxford Univer-
sity Press), 1974. 
Framing Violence 33
 
 
imperialism are gone and it is not the intention of Malaya to perpetuate or revive them”.79 
Despite these assurances all indigenous groups in Sarawak and Sabah rejected the propos-
als and put up a united front in order to defeat the idea of independence through merger 
with Malaya. The destiny of the plight of the Moros in the Philippines was interpreted as a 
warning example of failed efforts at integration. The case was understood as a hegemonic 
endeavour, in which the interests of the people living on the fringes of the national terri-
tory were sacrificed on the altar of a fictive national interest, which turned out to be noth-
ing else but the interest of the strongest groups which had usurped national leadership.  
In intensive discussions with the Bornean representatives Malayan and Singaporean 
politicians succeeded in changing this non-negotiable position into clearly spelled out 
interests which had to be safeguarded in any case. Now, every single reason given could be 
scrutinised, possible measures for alleviating fears and safeguarding interests could be 
discussed. A process of rule-bound and consensus-oriented bargaining between partners 
invested with equal rights was set in motion.  
The parties agreed that this would be worthwhile and founded the Malaysia Solidarity 
Consultative Committee, where all parties to the discussion were represented on an equal 
footing. The post of chairman went to Donald Stephens, a prominent Kadazan leader 
from Sabah and one of the most outspoken critics of the Malaysia Plan.  
Owing to their control over the chairmanship of the Malaysia Solidarity Consultative 
Committee, which was entrusted with the task of debating options for an eventual merger, 
the Bornean leaders could exercise significant influence on the negotiation process. Most 
of their far-reaching demands were met. The Malayan leadership also accepted that the 
creation of Malaysia could not be conceived of as an enlargement of the existing federa-
tion, but had to be a merger of equal partners: a new state. In the end, the Bornean repre-
sentatives to the Malaysia Solidarity Consultative Committee and the Inter-Governmental 
Committee which was charged with the formal negotiations on a constitution for the new 
state successfully pushed through all their demands. Extraordinary guarantees were en-
shrined into the new Constitution, among others the guarantee that the constitutional 
clauses on the national religion and language did not apply to the Bornean territories, that 
these two states could control internal immigration, that the state civil services should be 
Borneanised and the services of British officers should be retained until enough qualified 
Borneans were able to do the jobs, both states were over-represented at the federal level, if 
measured by the share of seats in parliament, last but not least, the provisions relating to 
the preferential treatment of the Malays were to be applied to the natives of the Bornean 
territories, too. 
In the last moment, Brunei voted against joining the federation. So in the end the  
“Agreement relating to Malaysia” was signed by representatives from Great Britain, Ma-
laya, Singapore, Sabah and Sarawak on 9 July 1963. 80 Two and a half months later Malay-
sia came into being.  
 
 
79 Tunku Abdul Rahman, cited in Milne/Ratnam, see above (footnote 78), p. 26. 
80 For the text of the agreement see Ongkili, see above (footnote 78), pp. 130-134. 
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3.3.3 Malaysian style democracy and non-violent politics at the 
national periphery: Sabah and Sarawak in Malaysia 
A look at the fate of these two states within the federation of Malaysia allows us to see 
whether and how the basic policy style is enacted at the local political level. Sabah and 
Sarawak were chosen, because they comprise a resource-rich national periphery, inhabited 
by a majority of people, who are neither ethnically of Malay stock nor subscribe to the 
Muslim faith and who have received favourable treatment and guarantees which withdraw 
rights and competences from the national centre. It can be argued that incentives are high 
for the national political elite to outmanoeuvre local elites in order to maximise the inter-
est of the national centre. At the same time incentives for local elites to think about the 
establishment of an independent state are clearly present. Both has happened in the Phil-
ippines, as well as in Sri Lanka. In these two cases the national elites tried to marginalise 
the ethnic minorities and deprive them of their cultural, political and economic standing. 
In both cases the local elites eventually mounted a counter-nationalistic movement, which 
aimed at putting up an independent state for their threatened cultural groups.  
A very important difference between the Malaysian and all other cases is the develop-
mental policy towards the various peripheral regions inhabited by ethnic minority groups. 
Whereas in all other cases development at the periphery was stalled, Sabah and especially 
Sarawak were not neglected in the context of Malaysia. Their pace of development basi-
cally kept up with or even surpassed the national average during the last decades. 
If we look at the political history of Sabah and Sarawak, what stands out is the rather 
high degree of autonomous decision-making without intervention from the centre. Even 
though there have been several instances of open intervention of the central government, 
these came always on the “invitation” of one of several local contending parties trying to 
enlarge the political arena in order to win in a local contest. It ought also to be mentioned 
that the centre always retreated, once the issues were settled. Local parties, partly estab-
lished in the run-up to the union dominated politics in both countries until the middle of 
the 90s. Until now, none of the mainland alliance-members are represented in Sarawak.  
UMNO, the party dominating federal politics, came to Sabah only after the elections of 
1990 in a reaction to a fateful move by the local government party PBS, which had left the 
Barisan Nasional a few days before the election. PBS won the elections and governed 
against the federal government for four years during which time the federal BN did its 
best to make the PBS-government fail. UMNO took part in the 1994 state elections. Even 
though PBS won by a small degree, its fate had been sealed, when several of its representa-
tives crossed the floor and either joined UMNO or set up new parties which were accepted 
as new members of the Sabah BN. By 1999, the Sabah BN comprised nine parties, some of 
which were politically so weak that they could not even muster one representative in the 
state assembly. In 2002 the remnants of the PBS also joined the Sabah BN, so that cur-
rently there is no opposition left at the state level. In order to win in the 1994 elections, 
UMNO had promised to institute a new practice of rotating the chief ministership be-
tween representatives of the major ethnic groups, a practice that worked well for one dec-
ade, but was discontinued after the elections of 2004 because UMNO now has a clearly 
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dominant position within the state BN and argues that the chief minister ought to be a 
member of the leading BN member-party.  
Sarawak has been ruled for more than 20 years by a multi-party alliance under chief 
minister Taib Mahmud, who is a non-Malay. Although Taibs party, the PBB, claims to 
represent all indigenous people (bumiputera) of Sarawak, it is representative of the local 
Muslims, but not the Christian “sons of the soil”. The other members of the alliance rep-
resent the Chinese and the non-Muslim indigenous people. Even though the parties have 
an ethnic foundation, those representing non-Muslim indigenous groups have a small 
number of Chinese in responsible positions.  
In both states ethnic and state identity coexist. Basically all local politicians and bu-
reaucrats seem to hold fast to a very strong regional identity as Sabahans or Sarawakians. 
All claim it to be an important task to safeguard the rights of the state against any en-
croachment by the federal government or its agencies. Even though there have clearly 
been ups and downs in the democratic quality of Sabahan, Sarawakan as well as overall 
Malaysian politics during the following four decades, the foundation stone of the working 
system has never been put in doubt. Politics in Sabah and Sarawak as in all other states 
and at the federal level are organised along ethnic lines.81 It is organised as a cooperative 
endeavour between the contending ethnic groups, and the political system is geared to 
help bargain win-win solutions between representatives of the various ethnic interest 
groups. Most importantly, the cognitive foundation of rule-bound and accommodative 
interest representation has been kept in place for the last few decades. Yong Teck Lee, 
President of the Sabah Progressive Party and former Chief Minister of Sabah, character-
ised good leadership in an interview with one of the authors in the following way: 
“The most important factor [...] is to be able to convince his own group, whether a party or 
a racial group or a geographic constituency that he understands them and can advocate 
their interests. But he will not be a successful leader if he is so narrow. In the case of Sabah, 
to be accepted by the people of Sabah as a whole other than to have the bond with the peo-
ple whom you represent you must convince the others by your own action, your own re-
cord, that you also understand the fears, aspirations, and problems of other people – other 
than those represented by you. […] Taking a few steps backward. […] is not the end of the 
world, by having some compromise, by saying things to put other people at ease.”
82
  
The rules of political competition seem to be highly regulated and institutionalised. 
Several members of the Sabah Alliance, as well as high bureaucrats confirmed that in all 
important political decisions at the state level, there is a right of veto for even the smallest 
member parties of the ruling alliance. This option of safeguarding one’s own basic inter-
est, even if one is in a minority position, clearly is an extraordinary safety-valve against the 
danger of “majoritarian dictatorship”. One high-ranking bureaucrat explains as follows: 
“any major decision has to have the consensus of even the smallest component party. Of 
course, sometimes, when the majority feel that it should be the case and the smallest party 
in the component says no, a little bit of arm-twisting will take place. But if other significant 
 
 
81 This holds true, even though Sabah has been ruled by multiethnic parties for two of the four decades.  
82 Yong Teck Lee, interview, Kota Kinabalu, 2 July 2004. 
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group says “no”, they will have to contact and thrash it out. […] So here I think the phi-
losophy of Barisan Nasional is decision by consensus, other than by a dominant party.”
83
 
Chau Tet On, a former deputy chief minister of Sabah argues along broadly similar lines:  
“According to the constitution or the arrangement among all the parties, every party, even 
the small, whether you are big or small, has a veto. In my experience, I attended the State 
Barisan and National Barisan. Before the meeting they always try to convince you not to 
veto. If they are not successful in convincing you, they will not bring it up in the meeting. 
That’s why in the meeting always pass. Everybody succumbed. So this is the internal ar-
rangement. If you don’t agree on certain things, they will be set aside for the time being. 
And then they will also try all sorts of ways and means to convince you. There is all sort of 
negotiation, compromise and so on and so forth.”
84
 
In critical situations, we find institutionalised patterns of conflict resolution – in Sara-
wak for example the BN-executive group will meet, in which all member-parties are rep-
resented equally.  
Obviously, there can be only a very restricted role for the idea of democratic competi-
tion and of competing political visions in fair and free elections. To be sure, there is no 
open fraud in elections in Malaysia, however, the scales are heavily tilted in favour of the 
ruling coalition. With respect to inter-ethnic conflict-management the practice of agree-
ing on a joint slate of candidates in advance back-room deals is the most import phe-
nomenon, which helps to outwit the opposition who would seldom act accordingly.  
In such a kind of system opposition has a very specific place. It is necessary in order to 
pinpoint the weaknesses of existing policies and as a safety-valve. However, the aim ought 
to be to overcome the opposition by re-integrating it into the bargaining system, so that it 
can advance its cause from within. Success can be measured in the eyes of the politicians 
by how far they succeed in delivering a performance which either undercuts the opposi-
tion or at least enables the ruling system to reintegrate it into the system in the medium 
term. James Masing, speaking about his experiences as one of the leaders of the Dayak 
opposition of the 1980s explains, that purely mono-racial parties will lose out in the sys-
tem eventually, if they are not able to adapt to the fundamental paradigm of common, 
multi-ethnic interest. The prevailing ethnic paradigm is embedded in the paradigm of 
multiethnic cooperation and interethnic accommodation. Masing argues that  
“people do not accept ethnic politics. You can start with it, but you cannot move forward if 
you keep insisting on it […]. And I think that is a good sign. […] looking at it as a national 
concept, I think that is healthy.”
85
  
Four crucially important points with respect to inter-ethnic conflict-management can 
be deduced from the practices described here:  
 
 
83 High ranking bureaucrat, interview Kota Kinabalu, 2 July 2004 (anonymised).  
84 Chau Tet On, interview, Kota Kinabalu, 5 July 2004. 
85 James Masing, interview Kuching, 28 June 2004. James Masing currently heads the Parti Rakyat Sarawak 
(PRS), which was accepted as a component member of the national BN in June 2005. He is Minister of 
Land Development of Sarawak and after Chief Minister Taib Mahmud probably the second most power-
ful politician in the state of BN.  
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1. an intention to tackle the relevant issues, to discuss grievances and interests, but to do 
this behind closed doors; 
2. to search for compromise, which is acceptable to all members of BN. As BN is nearly 
all-encompassing in the political arena, there is a broad input from various societal 
groups.  
3. a closed door policy and BN hegemony result in a sharp, exclusionary policy against all 
those forces who are not willing to accept the informal contract underlying BN coop-
eration.  
4. a disapproval of ethnic outbidding by the people. Whoever tries to play the ethnic card 
loses out at the polls.  
4. Conclusion: Contrasting conflict perceptions and strategies 
for management of inter-ethnic relations 
4.1 The repercussions of different conceptualisations of 
fundamental political concepts 
The comparison of the three cases illustrates that no pure variant of nationalism is supe-
rior with respect to its ability to civilise conflict between ethnic groups. The case of Sri 
Lanka made clear that the largely ethnic variant offers no viable option, insofar as it su-
perimposes an ideology of ethnically based hegemony on a multi-ethnic people, thereby 
provoking ethnically based counter-nationalisms, which not only claim rights to cultural 
autonomy but develop an alternative vision of a homogeneous nation-state within the 
territorial realm inhabited by their ethnic community. The case of the Philippines illus-
trates the “Myth of the Civic Nation” in multi-ethnic settings. The imagined rational at-
tachment of civic nationalism to a political “community of equal, rights-bearing citizens, 
united in patriotic attachment to a shared set of political practices and values”86 turns out 
to be at least partially a mask for a hegemonial endeavour of ethnically defined groups, 
which try to superimpose their vision of past, present and future on the minorities resid-
ing at the fringes of the new states.  
Civic nationalism purports to be based on the deliberate consent of all citizens of a 
given state. This myth of consent however is based on “the contingencies and vagaries of a 
shared memory and identity”87, even if this is only reluctantly admitted by proponents of 
civic nationalism. Simply because there is the bonding myth of agreement, there can be no 
right/option to disagree. As the myth of consent is based on the individual members of 
the citizenry, forms of groupness which put into doubt the direct political link between 
the individual and the nation have to be delegitimised. Interests organised along such 
 
 
86 Ignatieff, cited in Bernard Yack, The Myth of the Civic Nation, in: Critical Review, Vol. 10, No. 2, Spring 
1996, pp. 193-212, citation p. 195. 
87 Yack, ibid., p. 202. 
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lines cannot be expressed easily in the political discourse. In spite of these drawbacks, the 
model might work fairly well in basically ethnically homogeneous and economically de-
veloped settings.88 If, however, we encounter societies fractured along ethnic lines, with 
rather low levels of development and correspondingly scarce resources, for which the 
groups compete fiercely, then civic nationalism runs the danger of turning into a masked 
variant of its ethnic counterpart: a kind of legitimatory ideology for the grabbing of state, 
economy, social order, history, present and future by the strongest of the competing 
groups. This is not to say that civic nationalism is merely instrumentalised by ethnic elites 
in order to further their hegemonial designs. Rather, the nation can only be conceived in 
patterns and representations which ultimately derive from the cultural past. The result is a 
melange of pieces of tradition which are partly regrouped and integrated into a new 
frame, on the one hand redetermining the frame, and on the other being partially reinter-
preted by the newly invented modes of structuration. If the idea of a coexistence of several 
nations in one state is not contemplated, then even adherents to a civic vision of nation 
are forced to imagine a common past which is able to bind the loyalties of the future na-
tion. The only commonality which most often exists is the anti-colonial struggle and the 
history of the national-revolution which as a matter of fact often turn out to be particular-
istic events. Even if they, by and large, could be seen as a basically all-encompassing en-
deavour, they cannot in themselves provide the sole foundation stone for the new political 
entity. There seems to be a universal urge to “find” a common history and role model in 
order to provide secure ground from which to develop the future nation-state. As there 
are seldom historical precursors accepted by all societal groups as representing their past, 
one of the competing visions has to be chosen, if the plan is to set up a nation co-equal to 
the national territory. In these situations, the dominant group most often tries to rewrite 
their history as the national history, and define their cultural norms as the national 
norms. This need not be by strategic design, but ought to be viewed as a result of a rather 
natural process of establishing those patterns as “historical truth” which already provided 
their rationale for engaging in the anti-colonial struggle in the first place.  
This difference in development orientation of the states results, we would argue, from 
different value judgements made in the early processes of nation- and state-building and 
their continued application during the following decades. In the Philippines, individual 
freedom is clearly valued “above social democracy and the notion of collective obliga-
tions.”89 In Sri Lanka, neither inter-ethnic economic balancing, nor intra-ethnic justice 
with respect to a levelling of large economic differentials has been included in the ideology 
of state- and nationhood. Contrary to this, the Malaysian political class committed them-
 
 
88 Its limits can be visited in the highly developed but “multi-ethnic” states of Spain, France, Canada and 
Northern Ireland. Even though all of these states are economically very well developed, they harbour 
strong ethnicity-bound movements, which aim for independence for “their” groups and territories; in 
Spain and Northern Ireland underlining their demands with significant amounts of violence clearly 
aimed at hurting or killing people. In the old case of Corsica, violence occurs, but is aimed at objects 
only. In such a setting the strategy of separation might also work well, as is exemplified by the lone case 
of the former Czechoslovakia. 
89 Bankoff/Weekley, see above (footnote 30), p. 69. 
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selves to the construction of a just and equitable society – equitable in terms of inter-
ethnic and in terms of intra-ethnic equity. This basic commitment seems to be an out-
growth of the interpretative patterns applied by the elites of the various ethnic groups 
which safeguard the fulfilment of the basic needs of identity, security, welfare and devel-
opment of the various groups.   
One aspect stands out when it comes to explaining the will and ability to suppress eth-
nic groups and their aspirations violently, when it comes to the capacity to reign in with 
violent means citizens of a country: an inability to conceive of these groups and their 
spokesmen as legitimate political players. In the Philippines, as well as in Sri Lanka, the 
minorities on the fringes of the state are deemed objects of politics, but not subjects with 
their own legitimate political will. They had to be nationalised, an imperative which le-
gitimated state policies of transmigration, aiming at the destruction of the culturally 
rather homogenous people. In none of the cases had they a chance to influence state pol-
icy to a significant extent. The Malaysian practice, which gives all parties to a conflict a 
veto position, which tries to find win-win solutions and opts for issue-linkages, if com-
promises cannot be found within one issue, has been inconceivable in the other cases. 
Added to this, we might argue that democracy, both in the Philippines and in Sri Lanka, 
offered no potential for ameliorative action. In Sri Lanka, all efforts at resolution failed, 
because unfailingly the Sinhalese party out of power would take to the streets and mobi-
lise ethnic radicals. If necessary, riots could be instigated in order to block any develop-
ments which gave even a hint of legitimacy to the claims of the Tamils. In the Philippines, 
the very fractured nature of democracy helped in reducing the salience of the Moro issue 
for demagogic electioneering. In spite of possibly up to 100,000 deaths during the first 
decade of civil war, the Moro conflict is a non-issue at the national level. Energies and 
political infrastructure used in order to resolve the conflict are very limited.  
It seems safe to conclude that the cases presented so far illustrate, albeit in rather dif-
ferent manners, “the naïveté of those who would abolish ethnic differences in short order 
through ‘nation-building’”90 Any efforts directed at eradicating ethnic loyalties in the 
short or even medium term seem bound to fail. These failures are always costly in terms of 
lost lives and retarded development.  
As already argued in the introduction, even if we assume civic-nationalism to be the 
desirable model of state- and nation-building we still have to account for the costs of ap-
plying a civic strategy under circumstances, in which it might, with high probability lead 
to inter-ethnic violence. With respect to freedom and liberties, the model provided by 
Malaysia is clearly only a second-best solution. However, as nation- and statebuilders have 
to account for their treatment of liberties, they also have to account for the consequences 
of their action in terms of loss of live and retardation of development. It is probably sim-
ply unrealistic to assume that the civic way of nation-building is a way to modernity, so-
cietal peace and development superior to all others under all circumstances. It might be a 
noble ambition, which in many instances can only be pursued at extremely high costs, 
 
 
90 Donald Horowitz, Ethnic Groups in Conflict, Berkeley/Los Angeles/London (University of California 
Press), 2000 (2nd edition), p. 599. 
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which may even undermine the assumed advantages in the fields of freedom and liberty. 
It might be more sensible simply to try to devise strategies in order to “manage ethnic 
conflict, rather than to eradicate it or to aim at either a massive transfer of loyalties or the 
achievement of some consensus. They involve living with ethnic differences (real or imag-
ined; P.K.) and not moving beyond them.”91 So if in certain cases neither the ethnic nor 
the civic variant offers a viable option for violence reduction and peaceful inter-ethnic 
relationships, what is left? 
4.2 Pluralistic nationalism 
If we leave the ethnic foundation in place, but discard the nexus between state and nation, 
then we arrive at a third variant of nationalism, which, while being different from the two 
others, is able to integrate various features in a modernised version of pre-modern sys-
tems of toleration: the multi-national empires, from Roman to the Ottoman.  
Most modern theoreticians argue that nationalism ultimately aims at the construction 
of a nation-state. This, however, is no necessary nexus. States can be and are often defined 
without taking recourse to the nation.92 Seen from this side, there is no necessary connec-
tion. State and nation are basically separate phenomena – how else should we explain the 
idea of nation-building. This process aims at complementing a state with a nation not 
existing beforehand. Seen from the other side – i.e. from the nation – a different picture 
emerges. Many definitions argue that nations (i.e. “imagined political communities”) aim 
at freedom and “the gage and emblem of this freedom is the sovereign state”.93 In Emer-
son's view a  
“nation is not only a community of brethren imbued with a sense of common destiny. It is 
also a community which […] is characteristically associated with a particular territory to 
which it lays claims as the traditional national homeland”. He argues that “the nation 
achieves its fullest self-realization in the form of a sovereign state […].”
94
  
 
 
91 Ibid., p. 600. 
92 There is a host of definitions of stateness, which, however, converge on two separate sets of definitional 
criteria. A first one connects stateness simply to the quality of “recognition from already-existing states. 
[...] the idea of legitimacy through interstate acknowledgement is central.” (Robin M. Williams Jr., The 
Wars Within: Peoples and States in Conflict. Ithaca, London (Cornell University Press), 2003, p. 42). A 
second variant of definitions tries to figure out essential structural criteria of stateness, as being “a set of 
institutions which possess the means of violence and coercion. Second, these institutions in principle 
control a geographical bounded territory, usually referred to as a society. Third, the state monopolizes 
rule-making within its territory.” (John Hall cited in Stuart A. Bremer, Faten Ghosn, Defining States: 
Reconsiderations and Recommendations, in: Conflict Management and Peace Science, Vol. 20, No. 1, 
2003. p. 21). 
93 Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism, 
London/ New York (Verso), 1983, p. 7.  
94 Rupert Emerson, From Empire to Nation, Cambridge Mass. (Harvard University Press), 1960, p. 105. 
Similarly: John Breuilly, Nationalism and the State, Chicago (University of Chicago Press), 1985, p. 3. 
and Michael Hechter, Containing Nationalism, Oxford/New York (Oxford University Press), 2000,        
p. 15. 
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In this view, there can be no nationalism which does not aim at the complete nation-
alisation of the political space of a given state or the setting up of a new entity, in which 
state and nation converge. Stopping short of this might result from political expediency, 
the small size of the ethnic group and suchlike, but is not conceived as fitting to any na-
tionalist ideology.  
In contrast we argue that equating nationalism and nation with the desire to construct 
a nation-state (be it by cultural assimilation, irredentism or secession dependent on the 
status of the nationalist group) short-circuits phenomena – nation and state— which, at 
least in the ethnocultural variant of nationalism do not necessarily belong together. In 
historical practice, there are several necessary steps to identity-building and iden-
tity-transformation in order to imagine an ethnoculturally founded nation. An ethnic 
group might comprise a group of people who believe that they share some kind of com-
mon ascriptive trait – be it descent, language, religion or culture. In a first stage, ethnic 
identity – the feeling of belonging – is transformed into ethnicity: it is made conscious, 
cultural symbols are used in order to establish “criteria for inclusion into and exclusion 
from the group”95 This is accompanied by “a claim to status and recognition, either as a 
superior group or as a group at least equal to other groups. Ethnicity is to ethnic category 
what class consciousness is to class”96. By conscious efforts a more cohesive and coherent 
in-group is brought about. Some ethnic groups go further in the politicisation of the eth-
nic category by demanding that “corporate rights be conceded to the group as a whole 
…”97. Nations therefore may be created not only “by the amalgamation of diverse groups 
and the formation of an inter-ethnic, composite or homogeneous national culture 
through the agency of the modern state”, but also by “the transformation of an ethnic 
group in a multi-ethnic state into a self-conscious political entity”.98 A nation in this un-
derstanding might be interpreted as a politicised ethnic community, which either de-
mands group rights or has already been granted such rights in the political system. These 
demands can include the right of secession, of setting up an own state in order to integrate 
nation and state, but they can also stop short of this demand. They can aim at “grabbing” 
the state for the nation constituted by taking recourse to ethnic criteria, they might just as 
well simply aim at being an accepted partner in a concert of equals within one multi-
national state.  
If politics in a multi-ethnic setting is to a significant degree about nations and their 
rights, then an ethnoculturally structured polity may be advantageous, as long as each 
ethnic community has the same right to autonomy. In fact, new options for mutual ac-
commodation between ethnic groups might be opened up. Within some multi-ethnic 
states a polycentric political universe centring on the various ethno-culturally defined 
groups could emerge and politics could at least in some respect reflect the problem that it 
 
 
95 Paul R. Brass, Ethnicity and Nationalism: Theory and Practice, New Delhi/Dewbury Park/London 
(Sage), 1991, p. 19. 
96 Ibid. 
97 Ibid., p. 20. 
98 Ibid.  
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is not taking place within a nation, but between several “nations”. This does not necessar-
ily mean that all these “nations” have to be of equal status, it is sufficient that the funda-
mental needs of identity, security and welfare99 are fulfilled to a certain degree. Such a 
polycentric vision of the polity would be “multicultural” as well as for all practical pur-
poses “multi-national”.  
In such a multi-national polity, the multiple ethnic-groups are treated as nations in 
practice. This kind of nationalism conceives of the nation as a collective political subject, 
which negotiates – in concert, cooperation and conflict with other similarly constituted 
nations – the political rules and contents in one paramount entity: the state. The state, 
however, is devoid of much of the emotive language associated with and created by the 
connection of nation and state. The state is conceived to be foremost an arena for the 
negotiation of demands of a certain number of ethnically constituted national players and 
at the same time a set of rules to which the various nations subscribe. While the notion of 
pluralistic nationalism borrows its most fundamental support – ethnocultural groupness 
as structuration device – from ethnocultural nationalism, a similarly important device, 
which structures the interaction between the units of political agency is borrowed from 
civic nationalism – the principle of equality and equal rights, not applied to individuals, 
however, but to groups. Even if the inter-ethnic balance might be precarious in the long 
run, there is no need for either cultural assimilation or extreme counter-nationalisms, 
which challenge an official state-nationalism, as the basic needs of all nations can be safe-
guarded in the common state.  
4.3 Which nation to build? 
What do the studies carried out offer for the present and future handling of multi-
ethnicity? They can point to critical points with respect to two different tasks still promi-
nent in many countries and promoted by the international donor community as universal 
strategies for peace-building at the beginning of the 21st century: state- and nation-
building. Advice can be given with respect to strategies for the resolution of violent ethnic 
conflicts, with respect to the cases presented by us, but also on a more generalised level 
with respect to similarly structured cases. The questions debated here also matter in cur-
rent efforts to put such failed multi-ethnic states as Afghanistan and Iraq, as well as Soma-
lia or Liberia, back on their feet and finally on devising possibly violence reducing strate-
gies for democratisation in multi-ethnic countries with a high potential for inter-ethnic 
conflict.  
 
 
99 For the concept of fundamental needs as applied to groups see: John W. Burton, Conflict: Resolution 
and Prevention, New York (St Martin's Press), 1990; for a short overview, see: John W. Burton, Conflict 
Resolution: Towards Problem Solving, George Mason University (Network of Peace and Conflict Stud-
ies, 01.12.1997), (http://www.gmu.edu/academic/pcs/burton.html), see also John W. Burton, Conflict 
Resolution: the Human Dimension, in: international Journal of Peace Studies, Vol. 3 No. 1, 1998, avail-
able on the Internet: http://www.gmu.edu/academic/ijps/vol3_1/burton.htm. 
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Our three Asian cases illustrate the variation in form, content and historical context, in 
which state- and nation-building occurs. Nevertheless, there is a commonality between 
our two cases with high levels of inter-ethnic violence, which distinguish them from the 
Malaysian case. The political elites of the cases with high levels of inter-ethnic violence 
conceived of the state and the nation as being basically of the same extension. Ethnically 
grounded political identities were frowned upon and much symbolic energy was invested 
in the invention of a new national identity, which all citizens had to share. The idea of the 
nation as a collective political identity was no longer connected to any pre-existing feeling 
of groupness. Its construction was founded on the territorial boundaries of the post-
colonial state. The state was treated as a given to which a corresponding all-encompassing 
identity for the various groups, which happened to live within its boundaries, had to be 
invented. As there were no precedents of such an overarching political identity, the natu-
ral strategy was invention, construction and propaganda and coercion if necessary. In this 
process the strongest groups proved to be unable to devise models acceptable for all the 
other peripheral groupings, which differed in culture, language or religion. As overarching 
nations are founded on imagined tradition and history, some histories had to be chosen as 
the national histories, some traditions became the national traditions and all the others 
were relegated to secondary status. Anchoring the Philippines in the First Republic of 
1896 and Catholicism proved to be as exclusionary as anchoring the newly to be estab-
lished Sri Lanka in a Sinhalese quest for a Buddhist country. The option for many Filipino 
Muslims and Sri Lankan Tamils seemed to be either political, economic and cultural mar-
ginalisation and long-term assimilation on the one hand or rebellion on the other.  
If the basic need of identity is not respected, if one part of the population is excluded 
from the national imagery, and no viable alternative is provided, then the danger of vio-
lent reaction looms large. Liberal democracy in itself is no antidote to this trend, insofar as 
the civic ideal of citizenship rests no less on a common imagery of community as an eth-
nically grounded state. Values, norms, mores, history and tradition join together to form 
a cultural basin of commonality, which binds the citizens of the civic as well as the ethnic 
community. Liberal democracy is basically incompatible with a culture which differenti-
ates rights and obligations according to group affiliation, even though in practice some 
pragmatic adaptations might be sought. Equally unacceptable is the subordination of in-
dividual rights/interests to group rights/interests below the national level. The political 
organisation of ethnic interests and its active participation in the parliamentary process is 
normally frowned upon and discouraged.  
The Philippine as well as the Sri Lankan case illustrate that processes of disempower-
ment and marginalisation, of symbolic subjugation and internal colonisation are by no 
means specific of dictatorships only, but can happen under rather democratic auspices 
quite as well. Neither Dahl’s criteria of polyarchy100 nor broader definitions, which include 
 
 
100 Dahl’s list of necessary institutions of polyarchy include: elected officials, free and fair elections, inclusive 
suffrage, right to run for office, freedom of expression, alternative information and associational auton-
omy (see: Robert A. Dahl, Democracy and its Critics, New Haven/London (Yale University Press), 1989, 
pp. 221-222). 
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rule of law and the existence of a civil society, are sufficient safeguards against the exclu-
sion and marginalisation of minorities. The Sri Lankan radicalised discourse shows that 
civil society need not be an antidote to repressive politics. Even if political elites might be 
faulted in the first place, the phenomenon of ethnic outbidding could not work without a 
society which condones aggressive strategies aimed at consolidating the imagined all-
encompassing nation, which is framed as a mirror-image of the dominant group’s self-
image. In Sri Lanka militarised state-action against peoples demanding self-determination 
is supported by significant segments of civil society. Even if democratic rule is working 
fairly well, a return to a politics of inclusion is impossible as long as the majority of people 
support the exclusion of the minorities. Any effort at compromise is doomed, because its 
proponents will be chastised at the ballot box, as the case of Sri Lanka demonstrated re-
peatedly. Two explanations can account for this phenomenon. The idea of a superior self-
image, once established cannot be discarded easily. Any compromise, which grants politi-
cal and economic equality to the other depends on accepting the equal symbolic value of 
the competing identities. Chances for such a learning process are slim in a populist de-
mocratic system. Enlarging the own group-identity into the national identity equal in 
extension to the state, allows the dominant group to conquer the state and its resources. 
Control over the state becomes the prey and any compromise in the political and sym-
bolic realm would necessarily entail the consequence of a significant loss with respect to 
economic power and opportunities for clientelistic patronage. Whereas in higher devel-
oped countries the value of the state as an economic resource is limited, in less developed 
countries the state is a major source of welfare. So gaining control of the state for one’s 
own group becomes a most valuable political aim.  
The analysis of our three cases allows for certain tentative generalisations with respect 
to state- and nation-building in multi-ethnic states: needed is a concept of nation, which 
keeps a certain distance from the state. The best solution might not be building a nation-
state, but disconnecting state and nation, so that a multi-national state becomes possible.  
In a way, the problems encountered by the Philippines, Sri Lanka and Malaysia and a 
host of other countries beyond the first world are currently just emerging in the so-called 
First World. Their past and present point to our future.  
At the onset of sovereignty Malaya had to come to grips with an immigrant population 
of nearly 50 percent, immigrants which had not been invited by the Malays, but brought 
into the country by the former colonial overlord in order to serve his needs. Tackling a 
similar situation would be a formidable task for any Western democracy. The closure of 
the boundaries of the EU, as well as similar phenomena at the Mexican border of the 
United States, the notoriously famous camps for asylum-seeking Asians in the Australian 
deserts show, how civilised, democratic countries try to tackle problems of far lower mag-
nitude. Malaysia opted for the development of something, which is currently hotly de-
bated in Germany and other western countries: the building up of interconnected “paral-
lel societies” (Parallelgesellschaften), which are respected as legitimate political players. 
This vision of a strong, rule-bound state containing several nations-in-practice, which 
forge a social contract with the explicit aim of joint survival and development might pro-
vide at least partly an answer to the need to live together in one society despite owing alle-
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giance to fundamentally different value systems. It has to be stated that the melting-pot 
idea has not worked well in many of the multi-ethnic states of this world. The purely civic 
vision has worked considerably well in some cases, but it failed in many others – and we 
would argue, that it failed, because in political practice nation-building turned out to be a 
hegemonial undertaking, clearly favouring the strongest ethnic groups and alienating 
many others, often to the point of rebellion.   
Even if the development of a multi-national state, which prioritises group-rights, 
might not be an ideal answer to the challenge of multiethnic state- and nation-building, it 
seems to be able to provide a serious alternative to the purely civic variant. Firstly, by 
connecting political structure to ethnic group affiliation, it provides for a cognitive 
framework of politics which seems natural and meaningful to most members of society. 
Going back to structures, which already underlie social and political communication, 
allows the official authority-defined and everyday-defined social reality to be better inte-
grated.101 At the same time political organisation of ethnic identities remains a legitimate 
strategy of political participation and the corresponding units are meaningful for its 
members. Therefore there is no need for any efforts at hegemonial re-education according 
to the terms of a dominant identity. 
Secondly it provides reasonable chances for a) reducing the sources of potential fric-
tion, insofar as many spheres can be relegated to intra-group rule-making, and for b) 
channelling and thereby limiting conflict to inter-elite bargaining – needed are common 
rules on the cooperation of the potentially contending groups, but no common rules, 
equalising all members of the society with respect to all aspects of social rights and obliga-
tions. The state would pose as a territorially bounded assemblage of different (even if not 
totally equal) nations.  
The separation of state and nation allows for double identities and loyalties in the po-
litical realm: towards the own ethnic group and the multi- or trans-national state.102 The 
legitimacy of such a state rests to a significant degree equally on the input dimension, 
insofar as all ethnic interests have to be represented in a fair way, and on the output di-
mension, insofar as no group must lose out in the inter-group bargains. Even if benefits 
are divided up unevenly, there must be no losers.  
 
 
101 This differentiation harks back to A.B. Shamsul. As Claudia Derichs shows in her fine study on nation-
building in Malaysia, the central point is the degree of integration of those two interpretative sets. If they 
match to a high degree, the chances are high, that “the government (in German: Staat) understands the 
social reality experienced by the people [...] and adapts its policies accordingly. The more the definitions 
diverge, the less the number of people reached by the government’s definition and the lower the chances 
to communicate an identity shared by the whole people.” (Claudia Derichs, Nationenbildung in Malay-
sia als strategisches Staatshandeln: Bemühungen um die Schaffung nationaler Identität, Hamburg (Insti-
tut für Asienkunde), 2004, p. 84; our translation). 
102 This is not so unusual as might first be thought. Basically, this is similar to political structuration in 
Western democracies, where loyalty to the nation-state coexists with potential loyalty to a certain politi-
cal party or ideological current. The difference lies in the question of choice with respect to the second 
loyalty/identity. Whereas membership in any political sub-national group is purely based on individual 
choice in civic democracies, it is at least partly fixed in ethnic as well as in multi-national states.  
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Current efforts at rebuilding states like Iraq or Afghanistan, of finding ways for the re-
form of entities like Somalia tend to focus almost exclusively on institution-building to 
the detriment of an intensive debate on the possibilities of devising practicable solutions 
to the pending identity question. Certainly, institution-building must be a central focus 
and Malay(si)a could not have prospered without a stable rule-of-law, parliamentarian 
politics and an excellent civil-service. Actually Malaysia thrived on a set of very efficient 
institutions. However, it is important to point out that institutions are as good as the 
practices with which they are filled. Formal safeguards do not work, if they are filled with 
practices which contradict democratic and violence-free standards. Practices are deter-
mined by the will of the political elite and counter-elite to abide by the rules of the game. 
Institutions and practices must be seen as producing legitimate and satisfying outcomes. 
Their continuity or change depends on how far they safeguard the fulfilment of the basic 
needs of the various societal groups: identity, security, welfare and development. The 
most important learning process which has to be passed by political elites of fragile states, 
working to establish a “multi-national” state, is to realise that inter-ethnic cooperation 
enables win-win solutions, which are superior to any zero-sum outcome not only for the 
“weaker” but also for the stronger groups. This is already an eminent exercise in social-
learning. However, it is short of being the exercise demanded for a working civic variant.  
What, then, might be a tentative list of do’s and don’ts of nation- and state-building in 
multi-ethnic, and maybe even post-civil war societies? 
1. Don’t aim at constructing a nation-state in which there is an equating between nation 
and state. As states do not need nations in order to exist, so nations do not need states. 
Don’t enforce their equalisation. In many multi-ethnic states, the culturally and so-
cially meaningful collective identities (ethnic, religious, regional) are not easily super-
seded by a central, all encompassing political principle of nationality for every single 
individual. On the one hand, it might simply become a mask for parochial identities, 
which from then on are no longer part of the open official discourse of political legiti-
macy, while still driving political action. On the other hand, the more abstract princi-
ple of civic-nation might displace traditional identities and loyalties without being able 
to replace them. In the end this can lead to an anomic breakdown of a fragmented and 
non-integrated society or the emergence of modern ideologies of ethnicity, which 
clearly aim at internal homogenisation and external emnification. Taking traditionally 
meaningful collective identities over into the modern setting might provide the fitting 
link between state and state-wide society, insofar as it brings the much needed dimen-
sions of bonding and community into the political realm.  
2. Try to incorporate all (minority-) ethnic groups into the state in a way that gives them 
the opportunity to voice their concerns and influence decision-making on all aspects 
of politics which affect their collective well-being. The system must not allow for the 
emergence of structural political losers.  
3. Try to induce a process in which all groups have to work together in order to thrash 
out a common vision of the state, which means at least a vision of a common state. 
They should also try to find a common understanding of the nation(s) and their rela-
tionship to the state. If it becomes clear to all that there will be no effort at hegemonial 
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nation-building in the foreseeable future, and that existing group-identities will be re-
spected, then fears of marginalisation will be dampened and options for practical, pol-
icy-oriented inter-ethnic cooperation strengthened. This debate on the common 
(joint) state has to be set in motion very early in order to prevent either the emergence 
of a separatist ideology or nip those tendencies in the bud. Experience has shown that 
once the interplay between separatist demands and negative state reactions has been 
set in motion, escalatory tendencies are highly probable, whereas options for a bal-
anced inter-ethnic cooperation within one political entity progressively diminish.  
4. Frame a political system, which is able to support existing and possible future national, 
ethnic and religious loyalties simultaneously, because, then, chances of stability and 
peace are higher. Ethnicity and the idea of a plurality of nations within one state do not 
contradict the idea of modern stateness. Tradition and history have to be brought in 
for reasons of bonding. If ethnic identities are salient, don’t aim at depoliticising them 
(because it hardly ever works), but try to reframe them into a structure which allows 
for  
 a) emotional attachment by the members of the various groups,  
 b) participatory interest-formation within the political organisations of the various 
ethnic groups (i.e. check for a best-case scenario of participatory traditional and ac-
ceptable modern practices),  
 c) the development of a kind of social contract on inter-ethnic accommodation and a 
mutual acceptance of each other’s basic interests (there is no need for the imagina-
tion of friendship, only a guarantee for a sustained toleration of each other).  
5. Don’t focus on institutional design only. Institutional set-up is less important than 
institutional practice. Constructing a consociational state runs the danger of reifying 
inter-ethnic balancing at one point in time, so that adjustments cannot be made, 
which might be necessary in order to reflect changing environmental circumstances. A 
working consociationalism ought to be rooted in common practices and less in formal 
structures enforcing cooperation. It has to be learned in political practice. Only if it is 
able to deliver on the interests of all groups, will it be appreciated as a win-win man-
agement-practice to inter-ethnic conflict.  
6. Post-conflict peace-building programmes should aim at safeguarding gains in com-
munity welfare for all ethnic groups. Concepts for development should be designed in 
a way that they depend on the cooperation of the various groups. However, neither the 
maintenance nor the development of economic niches for ethnic groups needs to be 
eschewed. Most important is a balancing which guarantees that all groups are inte-
grated in circles of interaction, creating environments of mutual dependency. Fur-
thermore, when it comes to distribution, equality ought to be interpreted in the sense 
of fairness and equity and not necessarily of equal shares for all. The base-line in this 
respect is the perceptions of the contending groups. Trade-offs between economic, so-
cial and political power should be enabled, so that perceived disadvantages in one di-
mension can be compensated cognitively by advantages in one or several other dimen-
sions. It should again be pointed out that learning through practice is clearly preferable 
to coercion by institutional design. This holds true, even if we accept the idea of insti-
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tutional intelligence, whereby the specific structuration of institutions furthers certain 
outcomes.  
7. Try to induce learning at the elite level, so that the various groups and their leaders 
learn to accept and value the idea of an “ethnic veto”, by which ethnic groups can stop 
policies deemed to be contrary to their most basic needs and interests.  
8. In order to maximise political legitimacy in the crucial phase of systemic transforma-
tion, try to abstain from installing new “modern” elites of our “Western” liking, but 
work with the elites deemed legitimate and accepted by the majority of the local peo-
ple. Legitimacy of political rule does not rest in the newly invented structures, but in 
the legitimacy of the leaders manning them. This legitimacy is heavily grounded in tra-
ditional criteria of social and political leadership, and only persons who excel in these 
criteria have a fair chance of providing a sufficient degree of bonding, so that they and 
the new institutions are able to really implement political decisions which affect those 
people whom the leader represents on a traditional basis of legitimacy. By aiming at 
overcoming traditional forms of social- and political organisation, which are fre-
quently clearly at odds with our criteria of gender equality or human rights, by mar-
ginalising its representatives and empowering modern counter-elites, it is quite easily 
forgotten that those very traditional bonds not only stabilise those communities and 
thereby safeguard them against anomic disorganisation, but also that the majority of 
people will not accept the alternatives for the time being. Pressurising them opens up 
new lines of conflict and destabilises already fragile social settings.  
9. Do not concentrate only on the elite(s). Peace as well as violence are locally grounded. 
Ethnic mobilisation and outbidding works only when the people respond accordingly 
to the stimuli of the political firebrands. The case of Malaysia shows that ethnic out-
bidding cannot only be hedged at the elite level, but is actually defeated on the level of 
the electorate, that does not reward extremist rhetoric. The contrast with Sri Lanka is 
striking. The obvious differences in mindset are still in need of an explanation, as they 
seem to be highly relevant for the probability of violence, so researching this phe-
nomenon is a pressing task.  
10. State- and nation-building need our long-term support, as they are drawn-out proc-
esses spanning decades and not discrete events, which are completed after a few years. 
Therefore, do not tailor your support according to the sequencing of the international 
reporting on crises and catastrophes.    
